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1. Introduction: some structural and methodological  
considerations 
 
his thesis is concerned with a structured evaluation of the role 
and evolution of policy-making tools within the European 
context, with particular reference to the shaping of the internal 
energy market. First, some administrative and economic premises will be 
put forward, in order to give an insight on the main founding elements 
involved when building an articulated discourse on the subversion of 
pyramidal governance in the European energy context. 
  In particular, both the administrative concept of network and its 
juridical emersion will be taken into account, in order to assess whether 
macroeconomic network governance can in fact represent a tangible 
regulatory tool within the energy sector. Indeed, networks are horizontal 
and non-hierarchical entities which can play a leading role in the 
harmonisation and integration of divergent normative assets.  
 As a matter of fact, it will be particularly intriguing to weight both 
the scope and the extent to which networks of administrative bodies can 
interact with the macroeconomic context they are created in. In 
consequence, the second section of this dissertation will focus on the 
determination of the most significant economic factors shaping the 
internal energy market, so that the relationships between demand, supply, 
price volatility and taxation burden on end-users has are clarified. 
Evidently, correctly assessing the relevant economic background 
represents a key element in order to effectively evaluate the relationships 
interconnecting the diverse players involved. 
T 
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 The core of this thesis is represented by its third section, in which 
the energy sector is used as a case study through which the interactions 
between networks and differentiated market contexts can in fact be 
observed. More specifically, several controversial steps have been taken 
in the European Union to tangibly answer to the issues arising from 
energy market integration and liberalisation. Through an evolutionary 
perspective, the regulatory focal points of the process will be taken into 
specific consideration, using comparative policy-making analysis tools. 
Thus, this thesis will shed some light over the shift towards stability and 
accountability represented by the 2009 Third Energy Package, 
establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators and 
abandoning the pure networking experience of the previous European 
Regulators’ Group for Electricity and Gas.  
Does this shift actually represent a step forward, in terms of 
efficiency and sustainability of policy making? What does “efficiency” 
mean, when it comes to regulatory policy-making tools? These issues 
will be addressed, with an eye on the actual development of internal 
governance dynamics within the two institutions, as well as relevant ECJ 
case law. Finally, some critical (and even sceptical) observations will be 
put to paper, so that an integrated approach to the matter can actually be 
developed. 
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2. Networks as a regulatory framework: the energy 
sector, a case study 
 
he present chapter will focus on the concept of “network” as 
it is presented in the most relevant literature on the topic. As 
a matter of fact, the energy sector represents a fundamental 
turning point in the process of shaping and defining 
administrative macroeconomic network theory; thus, it needs to be 
closely observed through a complex and multifaceted perspective.  
It should not be overlooked that networks represent a key 
regulatory tool in European governance; very remarkably, indeed, they 
have been considered “the new paradigm in the architecture of 
complexity”1.  As we have seen2, from a merely socio-political point of 
view networks can be defined as a structured connection between stable 
and non-hierarchical relationships linking separate knots one to the other. 
The different actors involved are substantially independent, qualifying 
networks as horizontal structures based on cooperation and resource-
sharing towards a common goal
3
. This primitive attempt to determine 
what networks are (and what they are not!) underlines some paramount 
features of the regulatory model involved, which challenges and 
ultimately subverts the traditional idea of pyramidal governance. 
                                                          
1
 Cit. KENIS – SCHNEIDER, Policy networks and policy analysis: scrutinizing a new 
analytical toolbox, in MARIN-MAYNTZ, “Policy network: empirical evidence and 
theoretical considerations”, Campus ed., Francoforte, 1991, pp. 25 – 59. 
2
 See supra, p. xxx 
3
 BORZEL, Organizing Babylon – on the different conceptions of policy networks, in 
“Public administration”, 1998, pp. 253 – 273. 
T
6 
 
Actually, it is clear that this increasingly autonomous 
organizational  model could be studied adopting different perspectives. 
This paper will focus on the regulatory aspects of the concept of 
networks: new paradigms of governance can be extrapolated from this 
sculpt, on both a “natural” and a strictly juridical perspective. In this 
sense, it is paramount to stress the fact that the energy sector represents 
an utterly interesting case study, since in this particular field (as it has 
been developed in the European Union framework) both natural and 
juridical networks interlink, shaping a truly unique structure. Thus, 
networks will not be considered as a mere intermediation of conflicting 
interests: they will be regarded as the only participative way in which 
policy enforcement in the energy sector can be granted through 
(European) policy making tools
4
. 
An analytical approach will be chosen, while observing the main 
characteristics and possible failures of the macroeconomic network 
governance model at a European level, as it emerges from the formation 
and management of the internal energy market. In this process, a vital 
role is played by the close analysis of the interactions between 
independent and heterogenic actors
5
, underlining peculiar features often 
forgotten in the mainstream studies concerning supra-national decision 
making processes.  
Regulatory interventions occur in intricate and many-sided 
contexts: the main political literature on the issue of networks is well 
                                                          
4
 On the juxtaposition of these two perspectives, WILKS, Understanding competition 
policy networks in Europe: a political science perspective, in EHLERMANN – ATANASIU, 
European Competition Law Annual 2002: Constructing The EU Network Of Competition 
Authorities, Hart publishing, 2002, pg. 65 – 79. 
5
 Cfr. BORZEL, Organizing Babylon, cit., pg. 259. 
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aware of the insidious ground in which this analysis has to take place
6
, 
where public and private subjects share more and more of their resources 
and interdependent policy-making goals
7
. In such an environment, there 
are two distinctive alternative paths the European legislator could choose: 
privatisation and deregulation or horizontal coordination through flexible 
networks
8
. The latter will be discussed in this paper, as it has proven to 
be preferable in terms of market failures prevention as opposed to the 
policy making privatization model
9
. On the other hand, the shortcomings 
and downsides of this model will also be taken into account: shaping 
multilateral governance through networks could result in an excessively 
flexible regulatory scheme, which, being far from the traditional vertical 
model of policy making, lacks relevant accountability procedures
10
.  
Is a move towards accountability key to the development of 
network governance in the internal energy market? And, more 
importantly, is accountability a paramount element in order to define the 
efficiency of the regulatory scheme proposed? The present chapter will 
address these issues following a linear path. First, the juridical relevance 
of networks will be observed, from both a theoretical and a multilateral 
governance approach. Secondly, the construction of the internal energy 
market will represent an essential case study in order to assess whether 
the “move to accountability” actually is relevant to determine the nature 
and efficacy of the overall system.  
                                                          
6
 Cfr. BOGASON – TOONEN, Introduction: Networks in public administration, in “Public 
Administration”, Blackwell, Oxford 1998, pp. 205 – 227. 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 Cfr. VAN DEN BERGH – CAMESASCA, European Competition Law and Economics: A 
comparative perspective, ed. Thomson, Sweet & Maxwell, London 2006, pg. 403. 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Cfr. BORZEL, Organizing Babylon, cit., pg. 263. 
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What is more, even at this early stage of the present thesis, it is 
paramount to underline that the reasons why the following chapters focus 
respectively on competition law and efficiency of the renewable energy 
regulation schemes will be made clearer and clearer in this chapter. As a 
matter of fact, the choice to concentrate solely on these two aspects is due 
to the peculiar structure of the interlinking networks which are natural to 
the internal energy market. Indeed, this does not imply that other fields of 
scientific interest are non-existent or irrelevant: they have been cut out of 
the present discourse for structural reasons only.  
 
2.1  Networks as juridical resources: applying a relational 
approach to sovereignty 
 
The profound juridical nature of networks deserves a peculiar 
attention. Clearly, in this context I am not referring primarily to the 
concept of network as a transactional and transnational regulatory model: 
more importantly, we are to analyse the deep connection existing 
between networks and the way sovereignty is perceived. The issues and 
interests at stake are not secondary. The main question, rephrased above, 
is the following: when do networks stop to be evolutionary normative 
models based on horizontal multilateral governance, and become 
uncontrollable and incoherent hydras? In other words, efficiency and 
efficacy of the network model are to be observed here. Therefore, the 
juridical emersion of the concept of networks will be taken into 
consideration. In the first place, the relationship between networks and 
sovereignty models will be observed. Then, in order to contextualise it in 
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the framework of the internal energy market, some relevant structural 
economic traits of the general background will be presented. 
As notoriously stated by Cassese
11, “the legal concept of network 
refers to an organizational figure composed of public offices and 
characterised by two main elements: belonging to different entities and 
collaboration or interdependence”. The interaction between these two 
aspects, as well as the presence of other additional factors, represent the 
distinctive elements shaping the different networking models known in 
the administrative experience of the European context. Thus, while 
reconstructing a possible morphology of networks, the immediate 
juxtaposition between this model and the traditional national paradigm 
based on unity and hierarchy within the State becomes evident
12
. This 
paragraph will serve as an introduction, defining the main problems 
emerging from the delicate relationship connecting networks and 
sovereignty. In particular, the theory supported is the following: the 
contradiction between the two regulatory schemes is nothing but 
apparent, as the two paradigms, far from being conflicting, represent  two 
complementary ways of responding to differentiated governance 
constraints. As a consequence, the development of the internal energy 
market will be an interesting case study in order to underline the possible 
ways in which the two systems can coexist. 
                                                          
11
 CASSESE, Le reti come figura organizzativa della collaborazione, in PREDIERI – 
MORISI, L’Europa delle reti, Giappichelli, Torino 2000, p. 43-44. 
12
 Cfr. CASSESE, La funzione costituzionale dei giudici non statali. Dallo spazio giuridico 
globale all’ordine giuridico globale, Speech held – in the French version – at the French 
Court of Cassation, within a cycle of conferences on European Law organized on the 
occasion of the 50
th
 anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, Paris, 11
th
 June 2007. 
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First of all, it should not be underestimated that the macro-context of 
this discourse is the well-known phenomenon of the progressive erosion 
of national sovereignty, which challenges and ultimately overcomes the 
traditional idea of national State, evocatively portrayed by the image of 
the poleis
13
. The fundamental characters of such a reality, both on a legal 
and a socio-economic perspective
14
, will be quickly observed in the 
following paragraph. However, even at such an early stage of the present 
thesis, it is important to focus on the  foundations of this shift from 
sovereignty to macroeconomic network governance. The causes of such 
an evolution lie in three main factors: “high openness to the international 
network of poleis (cities); high openness to cultural influences which 
transcend ideological boundaries; high permeability of territorial 
boundaries” 15. 
In this context, networks become an inevitable “conceptualistic 
scheme”16 where a multitude of segments and knots, organised in cells 
and matrixes, substitute the metaphorical pyramid of the State
17
. Indeed, 
a network can thoughtfully be visualised as a matrix: this image is 
particularly suitable to translate the complexity of the challenges of 
macroeconomic network governance into the language of the 
contemporary legal reality. Interestingly, networks have been defined as 
“complex structures aimed at connecting different knots linked one to 
                                                          
13
 Cfr. PERULLI, La città delle reti. Forme di governo nel postfordismo, Bollati-
Boringhieri, Torino, 2000, p. 67 ss. 
14
 Cfr. BARBERA – NEGRI, Mercati, reti sociali, istituzioni. Una mappa per la sociologia 
economica, Il Mulino, Bologna 2008, p. 134. 
15
Cit. PERULLI, La città delle reti., p. 74. 
16
 Cfr. PREDIERI, Le reti trans europee nei trattati di Maastricht e di Amsterdam, in “Il 
diritto dell’Unione Europea”, 1997, p. 287 ss. 
17
 cfr. FREDIANI, La produzione normativa nella sovranità “orizzontale”, ed. ETS, 
Firenze, 2010, p. 105. 
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another by lines and segments characterised by a collaborative and 
communicative nature” 18. The social agreement on which the idea of 
sovereignty is built is therefore subverted by a circular and horizontal 
circuit, where the interactive
19
 nature of governance ends up 
reconstructing as a comprehensive matrix the complexity of “democratic 
and pluralistic States” 20. 
The idea of matrix emerging from these first thoughts
21
 implies some 
interaction (and integration) between economic, cultural and sociological 
factors. The unifying role of law in this multifaceted background is 
paramount, as it leads to a redefinition of the concept of sovereignty in its 
most horizontal and non-hierarchical nature. At a transnational level no 
clear vertical organisation can be found linking the different actors and 
knots of networks
22
. Indeed, it is clear that networking structures stress 
the importance of ties and bonds as archetypical figures of the equality 
characterising the different actors, linked one to the other through 
cooperation, collaboration and communication
23
.  
This particular aspect is substantial to the point that some scholars 
have ended up denying the existence of a networking model per se: 
according to this perspective, the concept of “network” is nothing but a 
                                                          
18
 Ibid., p. 109. 
19
 Cfr. PINNA, La costituzione e la giustizia costituzionale, Giappichelli, Torino 1999, p. 
97 ss. 
20
 Cfr. FREDIANI, La produzione normativa, cit., p. 158. 
21
 Cfr. PINNA, La costituzione, cit., passim. 
22
 Cfr. LOMI,  Reti organizzative: Teoria, tecnica e applicazioni, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1991, 
p. 54 ss. 
23
 Cfr. FERRARESE, When National Actors Become Transnational: Transjudicial Dialogue 
between Democracy and Constitutionalism, in “Global Jurist”, Vol. 9/2009, Berkeley 
Electronic Press. 
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“fluid organisation of knots that interact and dialogue with each other”24. 
This thesis, however fascinating, cannot be supported. Indeed, we are to 
define a theoretical reduction ad unitatem of the different juridical 
declinations of networks, which, far from being a so called “fluid 
organisation”, represent a tangible and challenging governance tool25. In 
this sense, I am referring here to the experiences relating to 
“coadministration” and “shared administration” within the European 
regulatory horizon. In particular, we are to deal with a “reticular model 
which has the effect to create a profound and structured shared 
entitlement of European and national administration duties, [...] operating 
in a cohesive way in order to realise joint goals” 26. 
Hence, networks are composed of interactive segments and knots 
based on the cooperation of heterogeneous institutional actors: they are to 
be closely observed as they represent concrete governance tools in the 
European panorama, being the result of the crisis of the traditional idea of 
sovereignty due to both globalisation and regionalism
27
. Therefore, even 
though networks exist because of the increasing complexity of the 
relationships between centre and periphery, they do not deny the 
traditional idea of sovereignty. On the contrary, network governance 
redefines in a relational and horizontal way the pyramidal structure of the 
regulatory framework. In other words, networks are organisational 
                                                          
24
 Cit. PINNA, La costituzione, cit., p. 110. 
25
 For an interesting and concise review confront AMMANNATI – BILANCIA, 
Governance dell’economia e integrazione europea. Governance multilivello, 
regolazione e reti, vol. II, Giuffré, Milano 2008. 
26
 Cit. CHITI – FRANCHINI, L’integrazione amministrativa europea, Bologna, 2003, p. 61 
ss., cit. in FREDIANI, La produzione normativa, op. cit. p. 111, in nota. 
27
 Per la saliente distinzione tra decentramento e “non centralizzazione” si rimanda a 
FREDIANI, La produzione normativa, op. cit. p. 106. 
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figures of cooperation
28
, thanks to which the clear-cut distinctions 
between different administrative levels are substituted by a “complex 
structure resulting from elements that interact with each other creating a 
texture made of branches, twigs and knots” 29. Its dialogic nature implies 
original decisional flows and regulation schemes, responding to the 
active interface and exchange between the different actors involved and 
collaborating to global policy making
30
: the equal cooperation of the 
knots in the network represents the focal point of a new paradigm, which 
is (not opposed to, but) coherent with the (physiologic) evolution of the 
concept of sovereignty. 
 
2.2 Macroeconomic network governance: European multilateral 
governance 
 
The role played by economic supra-structures in the development of 
regulatory administration is preeminent, as clearly emerging from the 
thoughts expressed above.  In fact, in order to properly assess the 
evaluation concerning the development of the relational approach to 
sovereignty referred to in the previous paragraph, it is of paramount 
importance to focus on some preliminary observations related to the 
evolution of the transnational economic context. Thus, in this paragraph 
we are to valorise the fundamental concept according to which figures 
                                                          
28
 ibidem 
29
 Cit. CASSESE, Lo spazio giuridico globale, Laterza, Roma-Bari 2003, p. 21. 
30
 Cfr. IELO, Amministrazioni a rete e reti di amministrazioni: nuovi paradigmi della 
global governance, in “Amministrare”, 2003, pg. 370 ss. 
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that are indicative of the improvement of networks emerge where 
regulatory issues of transnational importance occur. 
In particular, this section is focused on the idea that “networks are 
symptomatic figures of post-fordism” 31 . In order to consider such a 
proposition, it is fundamental to observe the historical and economic 
juxtaposition
32
 between the notion of “Fordist State” and the modern idea 
of State (so-called “post-fordist”). The first concept well-knowingly 
refers to the extension to the State of the vertical paradigm which is 
innate to the industrial and productive fordist organisation. Within this 
general scheme, the binomial combination of State and corporate is 
strong and powerful, as it involves both social and temporal variables
33
. 
What is more, it is possible to affirm
34
  that within this framework States 
fully accomplish the three traditional goals and functions characterising 
national paradigms: the contractual view theorised by Hobbes, Weber’s 
coercion hypothesis and Durkheim’s conception of State as identity. As a 
matter of fact, through the valorisation of the social compromise, fordist 
States represent the privileged interlocutors of the Keynesian dialogue 
between interest coalitions and group protagonism, while basing their 
normative power on the clear space definition provided by territorial 
boundaries
35
. 
Coupling networks with post-fordist States means acknowledging a 
crucial departure from the status quo described, with relevant socio-
economic, as well as juridical, consequences. Indeed, while in the 
                                                          
31
 Cit. PERULLI, La città delle reti., p. 32. 
32
 FANFANI, Storia economica, McGraw Hill, Milano 2010, pg. 144. 
33
 Ibid. 
34
 Cit. PERULLI, La città delle reti., pg. 35. 
35
 Ibid. 
15 
 
productive sector multinationals have imposed an a-territorial approach 
to economic governance, the regulatory framework needs to take into 
consideration multiple perspectives, including the new social 
composition of the Western post-industrial context
36
. The vertical and 
top-down approach, that in fordist societies
37
 shifted from firm to State 
organisation, paved the way to a constructive network thanks to which 
differentiated actors operate in productive, commercial, cultural, social 
and ultimately sociological ways. In fact, “the most active flows within 
networks have a strong inter-sectorial nature; they reflect the existence of 
networks of production [...] overcoming boundaries and continents” 38. 
It would be rather undue to remark the well-known observations 
concerning the nature and effects of globalisation on socio-economic 
relationships starting from the second half of the XX century, as these are 
copiously presented in the most relevant literature on the topic. Instead, 
we are to underline the close relationship between macro-economic 
issues and regulatory tools, in this increasingly interconnected network 
structure at a transnational level, acting as a “great sea crammed with 
archipelagic States, political entrepreneurs” 39. In other words, networks 
shed a new light over the contradictory and dialectic relationship between 
State form and macroeconomic regulation
40
, as they represent a brand 
new phase in the construction and development of the balance of power 
in the administrative sector. As a result, networks are primordial spaces 
of social integration, where both the formation of collective identities and 
                                                          
36
 Cfr. VELTZ, Economia e territori: dal mondiale al locale, in PERULLI, 
“Neoregionalismo”, Bollati-Boringhieri, Torino 1998, pg. 130 ss. 
37
 Mainly United States up until the 1950s, but even Asia and Europe later on. 
38
 Ibid. pg. 132. 
39
 Cit. SAPELLI, Comunità e mercato, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli, 1996, pg. 193. 
40
 Così, PERULLI, La città delle reti, pg. 34. 
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the control role pertaining to the State
41
 are developed, through the 
regulation of structurally supranational phenomena. 
At this point of the present discourse, one vital step forward is 
required: which are the applicability limits of the reticular model to the 
European multilateral context? It is clear that such a question is more 
than crucial to the development of this thesis, as it underlines some of the 
multifaceted facings of the European integration process. Interestingly, 
the latter has been regarded to as a “process of unification of two or more 
juridical orders, [...] consequential series of legal acts aimed at the 
production of an effect: [...] the construction of a single legal order, 
instead of a plurality of pre-existing orders” as it is “characteristic of this 
process the fact that, within its development, it modifies the norms 
concerning the production of legal materials of the integrating orders” 42. 
This definition is relevant because the present analysis will specifically 
focus on the structural function of networks as original policy making 
and policy enforcement tools within the European integration framework. 
Actually, networks play their most relevant role particularly during the 
modification process referred to above. 
As seen before, a network is a “pattern of regular and purposive 
relations among like government units working across the borders that 
divide countries from one another and that demarcate the domestic from 
international sphere” 43. This structure is undoubtedly coherent with the 
integration instances of the European Union, while stressing a close 
                                                          
41
 Ibid. 
42
 Cit. ITZCOVICH, Integrazione giuridica, un’analisi concettuale, in “Diritto Pubblico”, n. 
3/2005, pg. 11. 
43
 Cit. SLAUGHTER, A new world order, Princeton University Press, 2004, pg. 14. 
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cooperation between different levels of administration: it is a spontaneous 
and highly dynamic model. Indeed, it is essential to underline that 
reticular forms have been applied in differentiated ways within the 
European context
44, where a sensible evolution has occurred from “first-
generation” to “second-generation” networks. The former concept refers 
to networks based on “single”, uni-personal and highly technically 
specialised contacts
45
, according to the model of the so-called 
“spontaneous assistance” 46, while “second-generation” networks imply 
composite and multi-personal reticular structures, developed in vast fields 
and aimed at progressing new knowledge and competences
47
. The latter 
type is vital as it allows (and, to some extent, forces and enforces) crucial 
links between national institutions and branches of national 
administration bodies (e. g. Regulatory authorities)
 48
, thus formalising 
and fixing into procedural schemes the cooperation matrix at the basis of 
networks, while consenting to its proper and tangible juridical emersion. 
Interestingly, however, the result of such a mutation is not the growth 
of brand new managerial centres producing new binding legal material
49
. 
Instead, cooperation and exchange circuits and routes are developed, 
                                                          
44
 Cfr. CANEPA, Reti europee in cammino. Regolazione dell’economia, informazione e 
tutela dei privati, Jovene, Napoli, 2010, pg. 5-10. 
45
 A titolo esemplificativo, si ricordano alcune delle reti giudiziarie europee: quella in 
materia civile e commerciale, quella in materia penale, la rete europea di protezione 
delle personalità etc. We may refer here exempli gratia to some of the European 
judicial networks: the one on civil and commercial matters, the one on criminal 
matters, the EU data protection network etc. 
46
 Cfr. art. 13 of Council Regulation No 515/97, where this concept is set out as 
following: “The competent authorities of each Member State shall, as laid down in 
Articles 14 and 15, provide assistance to the competent authorities of the other 
Member States without prior request”. 
47
 For example, the European Consumers Centres Network (ECC-net), the network 
acting in the field of employment policies (EURES), the SOLVIT network. 
48
 Cfr. CANEPA, Reti europee in cammino, pg. 8. 
49
 Ibid. 
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through the valorisation of co-administrative procedures. The 
characteristics of such a form of collaboration within the Union, which 
have fruitfully been synthesised by Cassese
50
, will only be quickly 
reminded here: European Union-related discipline; public interest equally 
distributed among different subjects with regards to both structure and 
provenience; agreements between European Commission and national 
administration concerning the evaluation of the public interests at stake. 
As already mentioned in numerous occasions, this passage is crucial: it 
represents the neglect of a top-down approach within the European 
Union, while embracing instead a new system which is based on 
horizontal and multi-polar logics.  
Given the natural flexibility of network models, as well as the 
variegated exigencies they respond to, the reticular regulation of 
transnational economic phenomena within the European context can 
generate differentiated normative outcomes (while remaining inside the 
soft law perimeter). In particular, this discourse agrees with those
51
 who 
categorise institutional European networks in three areas: execution and 
policy enforcement networks (CESR, financial market regulation, 
European Competition Network); harmonisation networks 
(communication and energy sectors, on which this thesis is focussed); 
information networks (justice area, networks linking supreme courts...).  
It is evident that this distinction classifies networks according to the 
scope, goals and purposes of their formation and development. However, 
                                                          
50
 Cfr. CASSESE, La signoria comunitaria sul diritto amministrativo, in CASSESE, Lo 
spazio giuridico globale, op. cit., pg. 98. 
51
 Cfr. CRAIG, Shared administration and networks: global and EU perspective, Oxford 
University press, 2009; e CANEPA, Reti europee in cammino, pg. 14.  
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just like every artificial classification, this analysis may present some 
major inconsistencies and shortcomings when applied to a concrete 
reality as flexible and dynamic as the one concerning networks. What is 
more, trying to find a stricter and more rigid cataloguing would not only 
be useless but also damaging, as it would result in losing the quid pluris 
constituted of the peculiarities of each practical example of network in 
the European framework. Therefore, I have decided not to indulge any 
further in sterile general considerations and analyse the energy sector as a 
paramount case study of the overall network experience within the 
European Union. 
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3. The internal energy market: substantial economic 
background 
 
reviously, we have briefly depicted the juridical nature of 
networks as opposed to the traditional nature of vertical 
sovereignty. It is now of paramount relevance to focus on the 
economic background that led the energy sector within the 
European Union to become a paradigmatic case study in the analysis of 
macroeconomic network governance. This paragraph, far from aiming at 
representing a complete overview of the main issues at stake in the 
complex scenario depicted by the internal energy market (IEM) 
directives, focuses on the economic background of the market integration 
objectives pursued within the energy sector in Europe. In particular, it 
will show that, even though significant improvements have taken place, 
full market integration has not been achieved yet, as many barriers still 
exist in the IEM, with regards to both market structure and supply-chain 
relationships. Clearly, this is the reason why the core of this thesis will 
deal with the evolution of regulatory tools in the energy sector. 
The main variables at stake while observing the nature and 
structure of the IEM are retail market structure and consumer issues, 
wholesale market integration, network access concerns. In particular, this 
paragraph will depict the development of the EU electricity and gas 
markets from 2012 onwards
52
, while particular consideration will be 
given, afterwards and separately, at the renewable energy sources (RES) 
                                                          
52
 For a recurring observation of the previous years, cfr. the  ACER/CEER Report on the 
results of monitoring the internal electricity and natural gas markets in 2011, available 
on the official website of ACER. 
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sector. In the end, some conclusions will be drawn from the gathered 
data, in order to define some relevant areas of interest for future actions 
and envisaged improvements.  
 
3.1 Retail market prices in the electricity and gas sectors 
 
It is extremely important to evaluate the impact of the dynamics 
of regulatory tools on the evolution of retail prices, which may depend on 
both component pricing and external factors, such as entry and exit 
activity, foreign presence in national retail markets and switching 
behaviour
53
. The general assumption is that the IEM should create an 
increasingly liberalised energy market, where wholesale market 
integration and improved cross-border network access are beneficial to 
consumers
54
.  
The first striking element to take into consideration is that, despite 
general lack of economic growth within the EU, retail prices in the 
energy sector tend to rise both for industrial consumers (+ 5.2% for 
electricity and + 11% for gas in 2012) and for households (+ 4.6% for 
electricity and + 10% for gas in 2012)
55
, while demand remains stable, as 
shown in Figures 1 and 2. 
 
                                                          
53
 Cfr. supra. 
54
 Cfr. ACER/CEER Annual Report on the results of monitoring the internal electricity 
and natural gas markets in 2012, 
http://www.acer.europa.eu/Official_documents/Acts_of_the_Agency/Publication/ACE
R%20Market%20Monitoring%20Report%202013.pdf, p. 8. 
55
 Ibid., p. 124. 
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Fig. 1: Electricity demand
56
 in Europe 2008 - 2012
57
 
 
(Eurostat, 2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
56
 End-user demand, measured in TW/h. 
57
 Source: ACER, Eurostat, 2013. The figure shows an evident drop in electricity 
demand immediately following the economic crises (- 4,6% between 2008 and 2009), 
followed by a stabilisation between 2011 and 2012 (around 3.086 TW/h). 
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Fig. 2: Gas demand
58
 in Europe, 2008 - 2012
59
 
 
(Eurostat, 2013) 
 
Very interestingly indeed, relevant disparities between pre-tax and 
post-tax pricing of energy components exist across EU Member States, 
regarding both households and industrial producers
60
. As a matter of fact, 
such discrepancies persist even when comparisons between Member 
States with similar retail market structures are at stake. As expected
61
, 
market liberalisation has reached different extents throughout the EU, 
leading to different degrees of market dynamism. 
                                                          
58
 End-user demand – gross inland gas consumption (GIC) - TeraJoule. The data refer to 
the 27 members of the EU and they may be provisional for some countries (e. g. Czech 
Republic). 
59
 Source: ACER, Eurostat, 2013. In 2012, the natural gas demand within the EU was 
approximately 4910 TWh, registering a small decline (around 3%) in comparison with 
2011. 
60
 Cfr. Cfr. ACER/CEER Annual Report, cit. 
61
 Ibid, p. 244. 
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End-users electricity and gas prices are influenced by a variety of 
factors, other than taxation and network charges, which are added to raw 
component pricing. Such “non-contestable charges” 62  have sensibly 
increased in many Member States; at a later stage of the present analysis, 
a short but intriguing parallelism between this circumstance and the 
increasing obligations arising under Renewable Energy schemes will be 
drawn. For now, it is substantially relevant to underline that the 
decreasing contestability of energy prices for both households and 
industrial users has weakened retail price competition, thus creating 
tangible obstacles to market liberalisation and integration in the energy 
sector.  
Figures 3 and 4 effectively represent the various components of 
the post-tax total price (POTP)
63
 paid by end-users in electricity and gas, 
among 27 EU countries, while figures 5.1 – 5.2 and 6.1 – 6.2 compare 
pre-tax total price (PTP) with post-tax total price for both households and 
industrial consumers. Some relevant considerations can be drawn from 
the global picture depicted by the collected data
64
, which has a different 
impact on Member States according to the regulated or unregulated retail 
market structure present
65
. 
                                                          
62
 Ibidem, p. 8. 
63
 According to ACER, POTP is defined as the sum of the commodity price, regulated 
transmission and distribution charges, and retail components (billing, metering, 
customer services and a fair margin on such services). VAT, levies and optional 
surcharges are added. Differently, PTP (pre-tax total price) is the sum of commodity 
price, retail components and regulated transmission and distribution charges. 
64
 Source: Eurostat, 2013. 
65
 For instance, in 2012, on average, the POTP for households in Denmark (the MS with 
the highest price) was more than three times higher than in Bulgaria (MS with the 
lowest price). Furthermore, the lowest PTP (in Estonia) stood at a mere third of the 
highest PTP (in Cyprus). Cfr. ACER Annual report, cit. 
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Fig. 3: POTP break-down (%) in 2012 for electricity
66
 
 
Source: ACER, Eurostat 
                                                          
66
 Incumbent’s standard offers for consumers in capital cities (%).  
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Fig. 4: POTP break-down in 2012 for gas
67
 
 
Source: ACER, Eurostat 
                                                          
67
 Cfr. supra, note 66. 
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Fig. 5.1: electricity POTP and PTP for households in Europe (2012)
68
 
 
Source: ACER, Eurostat 
 
                                                          
68
 Measured in eurocents/KWh 
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Fig. 5.2: electricity POTP and PTP for industrial consumers (Europe, 2012)
69
 
 
 
Source: ACER, Eurostat 
                                                          
69
 Ibidem, vd. supra note 67. 
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Fig. 6.1: gas POTP and PTP for households (Europe, 2012)
70
 
 
 
Source: ACER, Eurostat 
                                                          
70
 vd. supra note 68. 
30 
 
Fig. 6.2: gas POTP and PTP for industrial consumers (Europe, 2012)
71
 
 
Source: ACER, Eurostat 
                                                          
71
 vd. supra note 69. 
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One preliminary observation regards the PTP level, which is 
relevantly lower than the EU average in those Member States where price 
regulation is applied to at least 90% of households (Malta, Cyprus and 
Slovakia are exceptions)
72
. Assuming that regulated prices are usually 
lower than energy costs, it is likely that market entry and investments will 
be hampered in these contexts. On the other hand, comparing industrial 
consumers to households, it is clear that PTP-POTP differences are tinier 
for industrial consumers than for households
73
, showing a more 
preeminent role of retail liberalisation in the industrial segment in which 
consumers benefit from market dynamics, including lower prices
74
. 
To sum up, “supply has remained virtually at the same level over 
the last few years. Since 2008, with a few exceptions, industrial 
consumers have paid less than households and tend to have benefited 
more from the positive effects of liberalised retail markets. The 
differences in retail prices across countries are to a large extent explained 
by the retail price regulation regime, competition levels in the retail 
markets, network charging methodologies in use [...] and by taxation 
                                                          
72
 Cfr. ACER Annual report, cit., p. 23. On the other hand, it should be noted that the 
Czech Republic, Finland, Norway and Slovenia represent opposite exceptions to the 
ones mentioned, since in these contexts the prices are not regulated and PTP prices 
are below the EU average. 
73
 Ibid., p. 27: In 2012, the POTP and the PTP price differences for industrial consumers 
were smaller (ranging from 9.15 to 27.32 euro cents per kWh), compared to household 
consumers (ranging from 9.55 to 29.72 euro cents per kWh). 
74
 In addition, in some countries, such as Germany, some energy- intensive industrial 
segments, depending on the level of consumption, are exempted from certain tax and 
levy components added to the total price. What is more, in 26 out of 28 countries, the 
POTP for households exceeded prices charged to industry. The differences between 
the total prices for household and industrial consumers in PTP terms were the highest 
in Sweden (11.1 euro cents), followed by Belgium (7.2 euro cents) and Ireland (5.9 euro 
cents). Austria, Luxembourg, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the United 
Kingdom recorded PTP differences of more than 5 euro cents/kWh. (source: ACER 
annual report, Eurostat). 
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regimes. In most cases, the energy component represents less than half of 
the bill, with taxation and network costs accounting for the remainder”75. 
What is more, over the last few years the so-called non-contestable 
components appear to have significantly increased in many MSs, 
particularly due to the costs of the Renewable Energy Sources support 
schemes and regulations
76
, as clearly shown by Fig. 3. Such 
considerations can effectively be summarised in Figure 7, representing 
the growth rate of energy POTP in most Member States having or lacking 
price regulation regimes. 
                                                          
75
 ACER/CEER annual Market Monitoring Report, 2012, p. 26. 
76
 Ibidem. 
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Fig. 7: POTP compounded annual growth rate (CAGR
77
) – Europe – 2008 to 2012 (%) 
 
Source: Eurostat, ACER 
                                                          
77
 The Compound Annual Growth Rate is calculated by taking the 4th root of the total percentage of the year-on-year growth rate for the analysed period 
(2008 to 2012), cfr. ACER market monitoring report 2012, cit., p. 24. 
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3.2 Retail market integration and regulatory 
framework 
 
As anticipated, a second fundamental element to be taken into 
account when defining the substantial economic background to the 
definition of the Internal Energy Market is the degree of retail market 
integration reached in the energy sector across EU Member States. In 
particular, the extent to which foreign suppliers have expanded their 
coverage across borders will be taken into account. Tables 1 and 2 show 
an overview of, respectively, electricity and gas supply side substitution 
to promote retail market integration within EU capital cities in 2012
78
. 
Tab. 1: foreign presence (%) and incumbent’s market share in the 
electricity sector (EU, 2012)
79
 
 
Estimated incumbent maket share in the household market 
december 2012 (capitals) 
>90% Between 50 and 90% 
Less than 
50% 
P
re
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ce
 o
f 
fo
re
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n
 p
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er
s 
 
(c
ap
it
al
 c
it
y
) 
>50% 
BG(1/1); HU (1/2); 
RO(1/1) 
    
Between 20 and 
50% 
  
CZ(5724); ES(4/16); 
NL(6/18); 
PT(2/14); BE(2/6) 
GB(4/14) 
Between  0 and 20% NI(1/4); SK(6/16) 
DE(1/14); FL(2/37); 
IE(1/4); 
IT(2/7) 
SE(4/41) 
0% 
CY(0/1); MT(0/1); 
GR(0/1) 
LT(0/1); LU(0/6); 
LV(0/1); 
EE(0/1); PL(2/7); 
FR(1/9) 
AT(0/18); DK(0/19); 
SI(0/8) 
NO(0/11) 
 
                                                          
78
 The data collected refers to the market monitoring reports by National Regulatory 
Authorities and may therefore contain some inaccuracies due to monitoring fallacies in 
the above mentioned Authorities. Similar considerations can be found in ACER annual 
reports (cit.). 
79
 The figure reported with each MS represents the number of foreign retailers/the 
number of retailers present in capital cities. 
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Source: Eurostat, NRAs 
 
Tab. 2: foreign presence (%) and incumbent’s market share in the gas 
sector (EU, 2012)
80
 
 
Estimated incumbent maket share in the household market 
december 2012 (capitals) 
>90% Between 70 and 90% Less than 70% 
P
re
se
n
ce
 o
f 
fo
re
ig
n
 p
la
y
er
s 
 
(c
ap
it
al
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it
y
) 
>50% RO(1/1)   
ES(4/6); 
SK(9/12) 
Between 20 and 
50% 
  
IT(4/8); FR(3/8); 
IE(2/4); BE(2/4) 
NL(6/18); 
CZ(4/18); 
GB(4/14) 
Between  0 and 
20% 
    
AT(2/10); 
DK(2/11); 
DE(4/74); 
SE(1/6) 
0% 
GR(0/1); BG(0/1); 
EE(0/1); 
FI(0/1);LT(0/1); 
LV(0/1); EE(0/1); 
PL(0/1); 
PT(0/3) 
Sl(0/6)   
 
Source: Eurostat, NRAs 
Clearly, relevant discrepancies between Member States persist 
both in the electricity and in the gas scenarios. Interestingly, the countries 
where a stronger foreign presence can be envisaged in the electricity 
supply side tend to be only partially the same as those where gas supply 
energy is mostly provided by foreign suppliers. In this sense, particularly 
emblematic are the cases of Great Britain and the Netherlands, which 
show in both gas and electricity supply a significant foreign presence. On 
the other hand, cross-border presence is only relevant in the electricity 
supply market for Portugal, which is, along with other geographically 
                                                          
80
 See supra note 79. 
36 
 
peripheral countries
81
, one of the least integrated gas retail market 
environments
82
.  
The data presented point in the direction of considerable barriers 
to market entry in the energy retail sector still existing across EU 
Member States. It should be noted that a high entry/exit rate does not ipso 
facto guarantee nor define an efficient and competitive market; what is 
more, the lines shaping criteria and relevant aspects of such an evaluation 
tend to get very blurry, especially when non-quantifiable aspects of 
consumer behaviour are to be taken into consideration
83
. However, the 
two-way market flexibility described through the observation of access 
rationes in the market surely provides the analyst with a fairly accurate 
set of data in order to assess the relevant market structure. Needless to 
say, these considerations are fundamental when observing the dynamics 
of regulatory practice (and network governance) in the energy sector. 
In 2013, a survey
84
 has been conducted among National 
Regulatory Authorities: its objective was a structured evaluation and 
ranking of the most preeminent barriers to entry to the energy supply 
market in the different national contexts. These include difficulties and 
                                                          
81
 E. g. Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Bulgaria, Poland, Slovenia. 
82
 In this sense, diachronic data should not be underestimated. According to ACER 
monitorin reports (2012), “Between 2008 and 2012 Belgium, Germany, Spain and 
Portugal recorded a significant net increase in the number of electricity sup- pliers, 
while the Czech Republic, Germany, Ireland, Slovakia and the Nether- lands recorded a 
net increase in the number of gas retailers. However, little or no effective entry 
occurred in a significant number of MSs, such as Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Poland and Sweden for gas and in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia and Malta for 
electricity.”, Annual Report, cit., p. 8. 
83
For example, intertia, risk aversion or consumer loyalty might work as entry barriers 
to the market. 
84
 ACER NRAs survey, 2013, available at 
http://www.acer.europa.eu/Official_documents/Acts_of_the_Agency/Publication/ACE
R%20Work%20Programme%202014.pdf, p. 244 ss. 
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reluctance of consumers to switch, illiquid and concentrated wholesale 
markets (especially in the gas sector), insufficiently unbundled suppliers 
(notably among electricity suppliers), retail price regulation and 
regulatory framework of network pricing
85
. Interestingly, no clear pattern 
has been defined both with regards to energy sectors and geographical 
consistency. Nonetheless, it is important to note that these considerations 
play a paramount role when tracing the basis of the main economic 
background influencing policy-making, thus they should not be 
underestimated.  
In particular, the interactions between consumer choice and 
switching behaviour need to be closely observed from a juridical 
perspective in order to define a regulatory framework that does not 
interfere with the ability of suppliers to set prices in a competitive 
environment. As a matter of fact, the strive for an equilibrated balance 
between political considerations and underlying supply needs is the basis 
of the regulatory tools defining prices, which still represent a concrete 
and persistent reality in the majority of EU countries
86
. End-user tariffs 
are applied by a high number of Member States, either
87
 in the form of 
price cap, revenue cap or rate of return/cost plus
88
, while only a few 
players sponsor an entirely liberalised market. The latter is the case of, 
among others, Great Britain, Germany and Scandinavian countries, which 
                                                          
85
 Cfr. ACER market monitoring annual report, cit., p. 135. 
86
 Ibid., p. 10. 
87
 Vast literature can be found, delimiting the structural differences between these 
techniques. Inter alia, cfr. WHISH-BAILEY, Competition Law, Oxford University Press, 
2011, p. 355 ss.  
88
 The rate of return/cost plus is the most widely spread regulatory tool used by EU 
MSs in order to set supply prices. Italy, France, and Northern Ireland are among the 
main State actors using this model.  
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make up for the lack of end-user tariffs with the settlement of a diverse 
spectrum of social security policies
89
. 
The negative effects of price regulation over the competitiveness of 
the overall market are well-known and established
90
; however, it is worth 
noting that generally
91
 there is a close relationship between regulated 
price and market price, which ranges around an increase/decrease of +/- 
5% of the basis supply cost. Arguably, nonetheless, price regulation 
naturally tends to reduce margins, thus dampening entry incentives in the 
relevant sector
92
. Hence, regulated prices should be consistent with the 
Third Energy Package (TEP), the structure and content of which will be 
extensively discussed in the next chapter of the present thesis, and they 
should be removed when the market can be considered adequately
93
 
competitive. What is more, consumer opt-out should be implemented in 
all Member States and wholesale market monitoring mechanisms should 
be defined in the different national contexts in order to effectively assess 
market integration. 
 
 
                                                          
89
 Cfr. ACER Annual Report, 2012, cit., p. 100. 
90
 In particular, increase in investor uncertainty, consumer disengagement from 
switching processes, strengthening of entry barriers to the market. Cfr. WHISH-BAILEY, 
Competition Law, cit., p. 344 ss. 
91
 According to ACER, this condition applies to at least 18 MSs out of 27 (ACER annual 
report, cit., p. 123). See also DIAZ-RAINEY, SIEMS, ASHTON, The financial regulation of 
European wholesale energy and environmental markets, USAEE-IAEE Working Paper, 
March 2011. 
92
 Ibid., p. 10. 
93
 Ibidem, p. 234. 
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3.3 Efficiency and sustainability within Renewable 
Energy Sources market integration 
 
As anticipated, some autonomous considerations should be made 
with reference to efficiency and market sustainability within the 
Renewable Energy Sources (RES) sector, with particular regards to RES-
E (electricity deriving from renewable energy sources). The 
considerations which are to be formulated in this section will be of 
paramount importance at a later stage of this dissertation, when policy 
making equity and efficiency in the energy sector will be at stake. Thus, 
this paragraph focuses on market integration of solar and wind plants in 
the context of the IEM. 
Figure 8 effectively shows both the interaction of these differentiated 
energy sources with each other and the increasing penetration of variable 
renewable generation sources in the IEM
94
, which poses interesting 
supply-demand balancing dilemmas to Member States
95
. As a matter of 
fact, the physiological unpredictability of renewable sources, as well as 
the structured variability of their usage, has to be made consistent with 
the heterogenic variability of energy demand
96
. Moreover, RES 
curtailments (mostly due to transmission constraints
97
) and power system 
                                                          
94
 In 2012, according to ENTSO-E, renewable sources made up to 23% of the total 
energy demand in the EU. 
95
 In particular, Denmark, Germany, Portugal and Spain have a leading role within the 
European scenario in order to promote the ne west technologies in this area of 
interest. 
96
 Cfr. ACER 2014 working plan, cit., p. 133. 
97
 Cfr. Great Britain and Italy. 
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adequacy needs to be rightfully assessed
98
, in order to evaluate the most 
efficient way to handle intermittency in this energy sector. The regulatory 
interface of these exemplificative references is evident, since energy loss 
due to curtailment (especially when wind-generated energy is at stake) 
has proven
99
 to decrease when faced with increasing network access
100
. 
What is more, cross-border capacity (hence, internal market integration) 
needs to be implemented in order to reduce energy loss, as well as 
introducing more market-based methods to allocate curtailments across 
RES plants
101
. 
Indeed, “the best way to pursue the deployment of sufficient flexible 
resources in the system is to create a well-functioning energy market 
[...]This renders sound prices that attract existing resources in the system 
to participate in the supply of flexible electricity. Moreover, these prices 
will send appropriate signals to the market for investments in generation 
and in distribution and transmission networks’ expansions.” 102  Cross-
border intraday, as well as balancing trade, can therefore be implemented, 
while ensuring efficient energy flows from divergent areas sharing an 
inverted supply-to-demand relationship. 
To sum up, in order to better integrate RES in the global energy 
system, efficient cross-border trade and well-functioning wholesale 
electricity markets are required.  These elements should be able to 
deliver sound prices, reflecting the correct value for flexibility. This 
                                                          
98
 Cfr. ENTSO-E electricity reports, available at entsoe.eu/publications/system-
development-reports/outlook-reports/. 
99
 Ibid., p. 134. 
100
 In this sense, the German example is emblematic. 
101
 Cfr. ACER Annual market monitoring report, 2012, cit., p. 119. 
102
 Ibid.., p. 124. 
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would render the right incentives for investment in, inter alia, flexible 
new plants, storage, distributed generation, demand-side response 
technologies
103
. 
                                                          
103
 Ibidem. 
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Fig. 8: Aggregated solar and wind production
104
 in Europe (2000-2012)
105
 
 
Source: Eurostat (2013), ENTSO-E (2012) 
                                                          
104
 Measured in TWh. 
105
 Cfr. ACER Annual market monitoring report 2012, cit., p. 111. 
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3.4 Some (preliminary) conclusions 
 
This section was aimed at tracing some fundamental economic 
background to the relevant policy observations that will be put forward in 
the following chapter. Firstly, the retail market structure of both 
electricity and gas within the internal energy market framework has been 
taken into account; then, some practical considerations concerning the 
level and essential structure of both market integration and regulatory 
environment have been made. In the end, some paramount notes 
concerning recent trends and areas of interest in the renewable energy 
sources sector have been defined in order to implement a well-structured 
reasoning in chapter 5 of the present thesis. 
Assuming the definition of the internal energy market as a feasible 
target to be reached through the cooperation of both juridical and 
economic tools, it is therefore crucial to determine the areas of 
intervention in which policy-makers (through the network governance 
structure depicted in chapter 2, as shaped by the European legislator in 
the way analysed in chapter 4) have to take further action so that 
European consumers can actually benefit from a truly harmonised 
market. 
In particular, an efficient achievement of European goals in the 
energy sector has to include, along with a well-implemented transposition 
in the totality of Member States of the relevant directives, a clear 
fostering of market integration rules. As a matter of fact, the collected 
data underline that market fragmentation leads to conspicuous social 
losses, in both the electricity and gas sectors. Therefore, a binding set of 
44 
 
rules needs to be implemented in a network governance context, where 
participative policy-making devices and mechanisms recreate a suitable 
environment for a competitive market, at retail and wholesale level. 
Hence, concerted action is key to factual implementation of consumer-
oriented IEM structuring.  
However, a central question remains: is it possible to determine 
whether such a governance tool can be defined as a truly ex ante or ex 
post one? In other words, is governance through networks in the energy 
sector a truly participative policy-making instrument? Quid with regards 
to its interaction with European antitrust legislation? The next chapter 
will address these issues following a linear path: through an evolutionary 
approach, the policy borders of the matter will be traced.  
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4 ERGEG to ACER: networks and the energy sector in 
the EU 
 
t this stage of the present thesis, two important premises 
have already been put forward. First, the concept of 
network governance has been defined, while taking into 
consideration the  main socio-political literature on the 
topic, as well as the juridical translation of such an idea in the European 
context. Then, the key traits of the relevant economic background have 
been recalled, with both regards to the retail energy market and the nature 
and scope of market integration in the electricity and gas sectors. These 
considerations, along with the quick observations concerning the main 
problematic issues in the renewable energy sector, all point in the 
direction of shaping the feasibility of the Internal Energy Market within 
the European Union.  
Challengingly enough, several controversial steps have been taken 
in the European Union to tangibly answer to the issues arising from the 
energy market integration. In this chapter, an evolutionary perspective 
will be adopted, from both a theoretical and a practical point of view. In 
particular, the regulatory focal points of the process will be taken into 
specific consideration, using comparative policy-making analysis tools. 
What is more, a holistic approach has been chosen in order to convey 
both the obvious connection between juridical and economic concerns, 
and the one linking macroeconomic risks to evidence-based policy 
making mechanisms.  
A 
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As seen
106
, the traditional organisation of energy markets is based 
upon the recognition of a physiological vertical and horizontal integration 
linking the various actors involved. In this sense, the primary reference 
made concerns transport and supply activities, happening in a wholesale 
and retail environment where regulated prices are a reality in most 
Member States. The shift towards market competition has represented a 
major change in the regulatory mind-set within the European context, as 
it represents “if not a retreat, at least a redefinition of the role of the State 
and its tools for action” 107 . Until 1990s, in Europe regulation was 
substantially based upon sector regulation, the compliance to which was 
granted by the theory of natural monopolies and exclusive rights
108
. The 
1987 Single European Act paved the way for a new systemic vision, 
implemented initially throughout the 1990s
109
 (First Package of 
directives: 1996 for electricity
110
, 1998
111
 for gas), that implied defining 
competition in a Europe-wide energy schema that goes beyond regional 
and national boundaries.  
The First Energy Package (FEP), therefore, mainly focused on the 
definition of common community rules for the classification of a 
(primitively) competitive retail market, while the Second Energy Package 
                                                          
106
 Cfr. Supra, p. 32. 
107
 Cfr. JAMASB, Between the State and Market: electricity sector reform in developing 
countries, in “Utilities Policy”, n. 14/2006, pp. 14 – 30. 
108
 Cfr. HANCHER-DE HAUTECLOCQUE, Manufacturing the EU Energy markets: the 
current dynamics of regulatory practice, EUI working paper, RSCAS 2010/10, p. 2. 
109
 Directive 90/377/EC of 29 June 1990 concerning a community procedure to improve 
the transparency of gas and electricity prices charged to industrial customers, O.J. 
17.7.1990, L185/16; Directive 90/547/EC of 29 October 1990 on the transit of 
electricity through transmission grids, O.J. 13.11.1990, L 313/30. 
110
 Directive 96/92/EC of 19 December 1996 concerning common rules for the internal 
market in electricity, O.J. 30.1.1997, L 27/20. 
111
 Directive 98/30/EC of 22 June 1998 concerning common rules for the internal 
market in natural gas , O.J. 21.7.1998, L 204/1. 
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(SEP), realised in 2003
112
, was aimed at implementing a harmonised 
network structure by giving cooperation and integration within the energy 
sector a more formal status. This multifaceted process culminated in 2009 
(and 2010), with the definition of the so called Third Energy Package
113
 
(TEP), the scope and efficiency of which will be lengthy discussed in this 
chapter.  
Almost twenty-five years after the beginning of the liberalisation 
process, vertical and horizontal integration figures, as well as relevant 
discrepancies between Member States, still exist. In particular, quasi-
oligopolies in the energy markets are still a tangible reality in the 
European Union, as “the intensity of retail competition remains 
unsatisfactory in most cases. [...] The push to complete the single EU 
energy market may be stalling, despite the major improvements 
introduced since the mid-1990s”114. 
Interestingly, such a hiatus between the objectives pursued by the 
relevant pieces of legislation and the actual status of the market reflects 
                                                          
112
 Directive 2003/54/EC of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal 
market in electricity and repealing Directive 96/92/EC, O.J. 15.7.2003, L 176/37; 
Directive 2003/55/EC of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal 
market in natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC, O.J. 15.7.2003, L 176/57. 
113
 Directive 2009/72 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 
concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 
2003/54/EC, O.J. 14.8.2009, L 211/55; Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas 
and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC, O.J. 14.8.2009, L 211/94; Regulation 713/2009 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing an Agency for 
the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, O.J. 14.8.2009, L 211/1; Regulation 714/2009 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to 
the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity and repealing Regulation 
1228/2003, O.J. 14.8.2009, L. 211/15; Regulation 715/2009 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to the natural gas 
transmission networks and repealing Regulation 1775/2005, O.J. 14.8.2009, L. 211/36. 
114
 Cit. HANCHER, Manufacturing the EU Energy market, cit., p. 10. 
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both the difficulty of generating an appropriate consensus among 
Member States while approving the relevant directives
115
, and the lack of 
a proper basis for energetic policies within the EU Treaties. As a matter 
of fact, apart from the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty
116
 and 
the European Atomic Energy Treaty, EU (EC) Treaties have never made 
any specific reference to energy policy making. Thus, energy is not 
included in the competences defined by EU primary law.  
The momentum of such an evaluation is evident: the EU can only 
legislate on energetic markets as long as the regulations concerned cover 
internal market or competition issues. "The project of the European 
Union with the liberalisation and the integration of energy markets is 
indeed not only unique in scale, but [...] also unique in the vertical 
overlaps of competences between Member States and the Union level
117
, 
which constrain the process of reform and the legal and regulatory tools 
available to support it. In retrospect, this long and on-going legislative 
process has been nothing but a quest to better harmonise twenty-seven 
separate national market designs and implement stronger ex ante 
regulation, both at the national and the European levels, given the 
constraints of the European institutional structure for decision-making in 
energy and the underlying vested interests of Member States.”118   
What is more, this ex ante perspective is not enough in order to 
properly assess the normative structure of the internal energy market. 
Indeed, antitrust regulation plays a fundamental ex post role in the 
                                                          
115
 Cfr. HANCHER, Slow and not so sure: Europe’s long march to electricity liberalisation, 
in “Electricity Journal”, n. 10(09)/1997, pp. 92 – 101. 
116
 Which has expired on 23 July 2002. 
117
 Italics added. 
118
 Cit. HANCHER, Manufacturing the EU Energy market, cit., p. 14. 
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definition of energy policy-making
119
, singe the IEM is a paradigmatic 
set in which network industries interact in order to design a peculiar 
economic model. The relationship between antitrust policy-making and 
harmonisation regulation is highly controversial: which one derives from 
the other? Which one influences the other? The last paragraph of this 
chapter will shed some light on these intriguing matters. 
Finally, one last element needs to be remembered when briefly 
depicting the policy-making context of the EU: financial regulation. The 
interlinks between financial regulation and energy policy-making, both at 
international and EU level, are clearly shown in Figure 9
120
.
                                                          
119
 Cfr. NEWBERY, The relationship between regulation and competition policy for 
network industries, University of Cambridge EPRG Working Papers 0611, 2006. 
120
 This figure is an adaptation and simplification for exposition reasons only of the 
much more complex schema in DIAZ-RAINEY, The financial regulation, cit., p. 11. 
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Figure 9: financial regulation vs. energy policy-making
121
 
                                                          
121
 IOSCO: International Organisation for Securities Commissions; FSB: Financial Stability Board; OPEC: Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries; IEA: 
International Energy Agency; JODI: Joint Oil Data Initiative; ECB: European Central Bank; ESRB: European Systemic Risk Board; ESFS: European System of 
Financial Supervision; ESMA: European Securities and Markets Authority (replacing CESR since 2010).  
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Indeed, financial risks and energy policies must be studied as an 
unicum, since they are profoundly interconnected. The affordability of 
competitiveness in the energy sector relies on the attractiveness of the 
market to heterogeneous investors. Additionally, it is tightly linked to 
macroeconomic risks, environmental concerns, affordability and 
sustainability issues. As a matter of fact, it is clear that the financial-
related risks of energy policy are closely intertwined with energy price 
levels and volatility, as well as the valuation of the environment, resource 
scarcity, energy security and energy-intensive lifestyles
122
. 
In order to further develop the main problematic issues mentioned 
above, the present chapter is structured as follows. First, some 
evolutionary elements will be put to paper, in order to briefly assess the 
nature and scope of the European Regulators’ Group for Electricity and 
Gas (ERGEG), a sui generis harmonisation administrative network born 
with the Second Energy Package. Its main characteristics will be taken 
into consideration, with an eye to the Third Energy Package and the 
evolution from a network model to an Agency one. In particular, the 
main research question addressed will be: is ACER (i. e. the Agency for 
the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, replacing ERGEG since 2010) an 
hybrid “network agency”? 
Consequently, the second and third paragraphs of this chapter will 
focus on ACER and its intrinsic nature. On the one hand, some structural 
elements concerning its tasks and the scope of its action as it has been 
delimited by EU legislation, as well as its internal functioning, will be 
clarified. On the other hand, some relevant criticism will be addressed, in 
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 DIAZ-RAINEY, The financial regulation, cit., p. 10. 
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order to properly evaluate the role of ACER as a policy-making (rather 
than harmonisation-only?) tool, its relationship with other EU extra-
institutional “policy making” bodies and its relationship with antitrust 
legislation. 
 
4.1 Systemic and evolutionary elements: developing an 
internal energy market 
  
 Networks are a regulatory instrument structurally used in the 
development of the internal energy market from the very beginning of the 
liberalisation process occurred in the mid-1990s. Due to the necessarily 
brief nature of this thesis, we will not deal with the interesting 
experiences preceding that of ERGEG, which mainly consisted of the 
European Electricity Regulatory Forum in 1998 and the European Gas 
Regulatory Forum in 1999. These forums provided the relevant actors 
involved in the energy sector (National Regulatory Authorities, the 
European Commission, networking industries) with a(n informal) sedes 
where to discuss the main issues at stake. However, only in 2000 a proper 
Council of European Regulators (CEER)
123
 was created
124
, in order to 
                                                          
123
 On the structure and nature of this Coucil, cfr. AMMANNATI, La regolazione 
cooperativa del mercato interno dell’energia e l’organizzazione comune tra i regolatori 
europei dell’energia elettrica e del gas, in AMMANNATI (a cura di), “Monopolio e 
regolazione pro concorrenziale nella disciplina dell’energia”, Giuffrè, Milano 2005; 
SCUTO, “Governance e mercato unico dell’energia: il network delle autorità nazionali” 
in BILANCIA-AMMANNATI, “Governance multilivello, regolazione e reti”, Vol II, Giuffrè, 
Milano 2008; DI PORTO, La collaborazione tra autorità di regolazione nella governance 
dell’energia e delle comunicazioni elettroniche a livello comunitario: spunti da una 
comparazione, in BILANCIA, cit., pp. 237 ss. 
124
 Anyhow, it is worth noting that CEER did not in fact substitute the previously 
existing forums. 
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give a more formal status to the matters emerging in the forums, as well 
as providing the different actors involved with an appropriate framework 
of discussion.  
According to its foundational Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU)
125
, the objectives pursued by CEER include the promotion of the 
development of gas and electricity markets; the cooperation in order to 
achieve transparency and efficacy in the relevant sectors; the promotion 
of cooperation and information-sharing between Member States, in order 
to produce relevant Opinions for the Commission; the study of shared 
procedures aimed at realising a more efficient and active policy-making. 
These objectives have proven to be not enough specific and structured; 
what is more, CEER was not fitted with appropriate dispute resolution 
mechanisms, which ultimately lead to its incapacity to represent a 
cohesive voice in its external relations. 
The aforementioned shortcomings ultimately paved the way for 
Commission Decision 796/2003
126
, establishing ERGEG, the European 
Regulators’ Group for Electricity and Gas. The shift from the voluntary 
model represented by Forums (and CEER) to the institutionalised (but 
flexible!) structure of ERGEG is a fundamental evolutionary step in the 
definition of the regulatory tools within the energy sector. Indeed, 
“CEER is based on a voluntary agreement among the regulators 
themselves, while ERGEG was founded by the European Commission in 
2003 as its official advisory group on energy issues”127. Moreover, the 
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 Originally signed in 2000 by ten National Authorities: Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Norway, United Kingdom, Sweden. 
126
  Dec. 796/2003, 11th November 2002, O J 296/14.11.03. 
127
 Cfr. ERGEG Rules of Procedure, prologue. 
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internal Rules of Procedure of ERGEG
128
 clearly affirm that “it is 
necessary to give regulatory cooperation and coordination a more formal 
status in order to facilitate the completion of the internal energy market”. 
ERGEG clearly represents a paradigmatic model of 
macroeconomic network governance. As a matter of fact, it structurally 
complies with the various requisites cited in the first chapter of this 
thesis: flexibility, homogeneity of main actors involved, horizontal 
conformation. Nevertheless, one major inconsistency remains: the 
network is based upon an ex offcio Decision from the Commission, and 
therefore lacks the spontaneity of its formation. In other words, it shares 
with other administrative networks of independent Authorities within the 
European Union (specifically, ECN – the European Competition 
Network) the voluntariness which should
129
 be proper of each 
administrative network. 
Structurally, articles 2 and 3 of the Decision play a fundamental 
role, as they shape both membership and apical figures of the network. In 
particular, it is clarified that “the Group shall be composed of the heads 
of the national regulatory authorities or their representatives. [...] 
‘national regulatory authority’ means a public authority established in a 
Member State pursuant to Directives 2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC, 
according to which Member States shall designate one or more 
competent bodies with the function of regulatory authorities, to ensure 
non-discrimination, effective competition and the efficient functioning of 
the gas and electricity market and in particular to oversee the day-to-day 
                                                          
128
 Considerando n. 5. 
129
 Cfr. FREDIANI, La produzione normativa cit. passim. 
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application of the provisions of Directives 2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC 
and Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 in that respect.”130 What is more, 
“the Commission shall be present at the meetings of the Group and shall 
designate a high-level representative to participate in all its debates”131. 
Clearly, this last provision introduces an interesting anomaly in terms of 
network policy making, since it modifies the traditional purely horizontal 
structure of (harmonisation) macroeconomic governance networks. In 
this sense, another paradigmatic element of the tight bonds linking 
ERGEG with the EU Commission is Article 3, paragraph 7, which deals 
with the annual report to the Commission which is mandatory for the 
network: “the Group shall submit an annual report of its activities to the 
Commission. The Commission shall transmit the annual report to the 
European Parliament and to the Council, where appropriate with 
comments.” 
In order to correctly assess the nature and intrinsic scope of 
ERGEG, its internal organisation should be closely observed. Article 3 of 
Dec. 796/2003, on this subject, specifies that “the Group shall elect a 
chairperson from among its Members” and it “may set up expert working 
groups to study specific subjects, on the basis of a mandate and as it 
deems appropriate. The Commission may attend all meetings of such 
expert working groups.” 132 Moreover, “ The Group shall adopt its Rules 
of Procedure by consensus or, in the absence of consensus, by a two-
thirds majority vote, one vote being expressed per Member State, subject 
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 Cit. Dec. 796/2003, art. 2 par 1-2. 
131
 Ibidem, par 4. 
132
 Cit. Dec. 796/2003, art. 3 par 1-3. 
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to the approval of the Commission”, which “shall provide the secretariat 
of the Group.”133  
Several important considerations can be drawn from the analysis 
of these provisions. First of all, with regards to membership, it is clear 
that three categories of members coexist
134
: a number of effective 
members (National Regulatory Authorities), a hierarchically superior 
member (EU Commission), some observers. As mentioned, the 
relationships existing between effective members are primarily 
horizontal, while the EU Commission relates to the other members 
through a truly vertical paradigm. Additionally, it is worth underlining 
that the so-called “effective members” are in fact national authorities 
with a complete and full juridical personality: they are “complete 
organizational figures” 135  and, therefore, they give their autonomous 
contribution to the evolution (and success?) of the network. 
Of course, the relationships interlinking the various members of 
the network are specified in the Rules of Procedure (approved in 2005 
pursuant to Article 3 of Dec. 796/2003), according to which votes are 
weighted in accordance to the degree of membership to the Group. In this 
respect, particularly relevant are Articles 3
136
 (chairperson and Board of 
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 Ibidem, par 5-6. 
134
 Cfr. CANEPA, Reti europee in cammino, cit., p. 58. 
135135
 Cfr. IELO, La nozione comunitaria di autorità indipendente, in “Amministrare”, 
2004; MERUSI – PASSARO, Le autorità indipendenti. Un potere senza partito, Il Mulino, 
Bologna, 2003, pp. 68 ff. 
136
 “The ERGEG Board of Directors shall comprise at least three and no more than six 
directors (one Chairperson and two or more Vice Chairpersons). The Chairperson is 
elected pursuant to Articles 6.1 to 6.5.The Chairperson will be elected by the ERGEG 
for a period of two years, which may be extended for a period of up to one year. In the 
case of a resignation of the Chairperson during the two year period, a new Chairperson 
will be appointed under the same terms for a period of up to two years. The Vice-
Chairpersons will be elected by the ERGEG, following the same procedure, on the same 
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Directors), 4
137
 (meetings), 5
138
 (working procedures) and 6
139
 
(deliberations), the analysis of which cannot be conducted in this 
                                                                                                                                              
terms and conditions as for the Chairperson. A Vice Chairperson shall replace the 
Chairperson at the ERGEG meetings in the case of absence or impediment.” 
137
 “The ERGEG meeting will be convened in principle at least four times a year and 
more frequently when appropriate. Any meeting of the ERGEG may be convened by 
the Chairperson or by the Board of Directors. The ERGEG meeting must be convened 
by the Board of Directors at the request of at least one fifth of its Members. The 
meeting should take place within two months of the Commission’s receipt of the 
request, unless exceptional circumstances require otherwise. The Chairperson, or as 
the case may be the Board of Directors, shall establish an agenda for the meeting. Any 
proposal from any Members will be added to the agenda. Unless otherwise agreed by 
the Board, proposed agenda items should be submitted in writing three weeks in 
advance of the meeting. The proposed agenda of the meeting and all supporting 
documentation shall be circulated to the Members (and observers) at least two weeks 
in advance of the meeting. The agenda and a note of the decisions agreed upon at the 
ERGEG meeting shall be published on the ERGEG web site as soon as is reasonably 
possible after the meeting.” 
138
 “The ERGEG shall adopt an annual work programme. The work programme shall be 
published on the ERGEG web site. The ERGEG may set up working groups chaired by an 
ERGEG member (or delegated to an expert from an authority that qualifies as a 
member of the ERGEG) to study specific subjects on the basis of a mandate and as it 
deems appropriate. The Commission and observers mentioned in Article 2.2 may 
attend all meetings of such working groups.” 
139
 “The Members present or represented at the meetings shall use their best efforts in 
order to reach consensus. In its working and/or deliberation and/or outputs, the 
ERGEG will respect the national and EU legislation regarding secrecy and 
confidentiality. Where the Commission informs the ERGEG that the advice requested 
or the question raised is of a confidential nature, Members as well as observers  and 
any other person shall be under an obligation not to disclose information which has 
come to their knowledge through the work of the ERGEG or its working groups. The 
Commission may decide in such cases that only Members may be present at meetings. 
The ERGEG may also request, where the presence of observers would materially affect 
its deliberations, that observers are not present for part(s) of the discussion. If 
consensus is not achieved under Article 6.1, the matter must be put to vote and the 
reasoned opinion of the ERGEG must be carried by qualified majority pursuant to 
Article 6.5. Members’ votes will be weighted in accordance with the voting principles 
of the Council of the European Union as foreseen in Article 205 (2) EC-Treaty. 
Members have as many votes as the Member State they represent. Unless the law or 
these Rules provide for a stricter majority, reasoned opinions are taken by a two thirds 
majority of the votes. The ERGEG shall identify and report any dissenting opinions of 
individual Members and communicate that there are .dissenting opinions together 
with the decision reached, identifying the dissenting member authorities. This shall be 
achieved by posting the dissenting opinions on the ERGEG website.” 
58 
 
dissertation for economy reasons only
140
. This simplified and flexible 
structure works in perfect coordination with the main goals of the Group, 
as clearly stated in Article 1, paragraph 2, of the establishing Decision: 
“the Group, at its own initiative or at the request of the Commission, 
shall advise and assist the Commission in consolidating the internal 
energy market, in particular with respect to the preparation of draft 
implementing measures in the field of electricity and gas, and on any 
matters related to the internal market for gas and electricity. The Group 
shall facilitate consultation, coordination and cooperation of national 
regulatory authorities, contributing to a consistent application, in all 
Member States, of the provisions set out in Directive 2003/54/EC, 
Directive 2003/55/EC and Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003, as well as of 
possible future Community legislation in the field of electricity and gas”. 
Substantially, the activities of ERGEG can be classified as 
pertaining to two different typologies: coordination and information 
sharing activities among members can be defined as a “horizontal 
competence”, while a “vertical competence” can be traced when looking 
at the relationship between the Group and the European Commission, in 
terms of “auxiliarity”. Overall, ERGEG builds common positions among 
its members, it identifies the best practices available in the different 
contexts and it points out the areas in which some normative action needs 
to be taken
141
. Yet, it is worth noting that the Forums established in the 
‘90s and CEER still exist: indeed, they provide a useful basis of network 
                                                          
140
 For an extensive analysis of these provisions, in comparison with the Rules of 
Procedure of ERG, the harmonisation network in the field of telecommunications, cfr. 
CANEPA, Reti europee in cammino, cit., pp. 58 – 63. 
141
 Cfr. ORTIS, I nodi della regolazione dei comparti energetici, in MARIOTTI – TORRANI, 
Energia e comunicazioni. Le autorità indipendenti a 10 anni dalla loro istituzione, 
Giuffrè, Milano, 2006, pp. 112 ff. 
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analysis, through a shared platform of discussion with several of the 
stakeholders involved
142
. 
From a policy-analysis perspective, the observation of ERGEG is 
paradigmatic of a new policy-making mind asset, based upon sector 
harmonisation and aimed at defining a common European 
macroeconomic regulatory space
143
. The dialogical process between the 
EU and Member States (through NRAs) is active, and the effects and 
outcomes of such an interaction are utterly important. As a matter of fact, 
their object and scope is double: first, best practices need to be pointed 
out and implemented; secondly, consumer protection mechanisms need 
to be effectively put to practice
144
. Choosing a network structure (like 
ERGEG) to pursue such a diverse objective is therefore groundbreaking 
not only because of the joint communication techniques used, but also 
because of the redefinition of macroeconomic governance tools within 
the EU space it represents.  
The main operative tools used by the network in order to achieve 
these objectives are working groups
145
 and tasks forces; both are based 
                                                          
142
 In order to facilitate an open dialogical confrontation with the various stakeholders 
involved in the process, ERGEG conducts a series of formal and informal consultations 
too. Specific Guidelines have been approved in 2007 in order to properly regulate the 
relevant procedures (see Guidelines on ERGEG’s public consultation practices, ref. E07-
EP-16-03, approved on 18
th
 July 2007 and available on ERGEG’s official website – 
www.ergeg.org). 
143
 Cfr. CANEPA, Reti europee in cammino, cit., p. 65. 
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 In line with the major concerns put forward by the EU Commission in its 2008 Green 
Book on Costumer Protection. 
145
 At present, seven working groups are established within ERGEG: 
1. Customer focus group; 
2. Energy community; 
3. Energy package; 
4. Financial service; 
5. Gas; 
6. International strategy; 
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on the horizontal nature of the relationships interlinking the various 
players involved. Additionally, ERGEG is provided with a peculiarly-
designed working tool aimed at defining, since 2006
146
, specific regional 
initiatives in both energy and gas sectors. In particular, regional sector-
specific markets
147
 have been created, and each of them has a structured 
sub-network flourishing around a Regional Coordination Committee 
(RCC), working in close cooperation with ERGEG, the EU Commission, 
CEER and the relevant Forums, too. The main outputs of these regional 
initiatives can be summarised as follows: “the amount of information 
available in the markets which will increase market liquidity and allow 
more robust competition; fair access to networks and infrastructure, thus 
increasing trading activities in the regions and between regions; improve 
compatibility of market rules within regions to facilitate regional market 
integration” 148 . Clearly, the common objective of all the markets 
identified is the unification of an extrinsically diverse and fragmented 
national and sub-national scenario; however, due to the peculiarities of 
each and every context, the modalities according to which the Regional 
                                                                                                                                              
7. Unbundling, reporting and benchmarking task force. 
Each working group presents specific reports both to ERGEG and to CEER. 
146
 Cfr. ERGEG Conclusions paper, the creation of regional electricity markets, E05-ERF-
03-06a (8th February 2006); ERGEG Paper, roadmap for a competitive single gas 
market in Europe. An ERGEG conclusions paper, E06-GMi-02-03 (28
th
 March 2006). 
147
 In the electricity sector, seven markets have been shake: Baltic (Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania), Central-East (Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, 
Slovenia), Central-South (Italy, Greece, Austria, France, Germany, Slovenia), Central-
West (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands), North (Sweden, 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Norway, Poland), South-West (France, Portugal, Spain), 
Franc-UK-Ireland. Clearly, these markets tend to be very interconnected, as shown by 
the fact that several countries pertain to more than one regional initiative. On the 
other hand, three markets only have been created in the gas sector: North (Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden, UK), South West (Portugal, 
Spain, Southern France), South-East (Austria, Hungary, Italy, Greece, Poland, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia). 
148
 Cfr. ERGEG Regional initiatives factsheet, progress and prospects, March 2007 
(www.ergeg.org).   
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Initiative operates necessarily have to be “customised” 149 . A strict 
coordination between Regional Initiatives and ERGEG is therefore 
mandatory, in order to check the appropriate development of the main 
liberalisation objectives of the network. Fascinatingly, this peculiar 
relationship between Regional Initiatives and ERGEG can be described 
as a strive towards a correct balance between autonomy and control, 
which had emerged already in the European Parliament (EP) while 
discussing the Third Energy Package
150
. 
To sum up, it is possible to affirm that ERGEG is a flexible 
network of regulators where both vertical and horizontal governance 
tools are combined, thanks to the heterogeneity of its members; the main 
governance tools include working groups and task forces, even though 
Regional market Initiatives represent an innovative instrument in order to 
secure the unification of fragmented national and regional contexts. The 
main outputs of the network consist of Guide Lines and similar soft law 
policy tools, which represent both a normative indication for the 
Commission and NRAs alike and a common ground towards energy 
legislation harmonisation between Member States and stakeholders, in 
accordance with Article 4 of Decision 796/2003: “The Group shall 
consult extensively and at an early stage with market participants, 
consumers and end-users in an open and transparent manner.” 
Having briefly depicted the some of the fundamental traits 
characterising ERGEG, it is now of paramount importance to focus on its 
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 Cit. CANEPA, Reti europee in cammino, cit., p. 70. 
150
 Cfr. CANEPA, La costruzione del mercato europeo dell’energia e il difficile percorso 
del “terzo pacchetto” legislativo, in “Amministrare”, 2009, pp. 217 ff. 
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evolution from harmonisation network to “network agency” 151 , in a 
pioneering leap towards regulatory convergence. As a matter of fact, 
notwithstanding ERGEG’s efficiency in data gathering and market 
monitoring
152
, its innate shortcomings are evident: the lack of legal 
bindingness of its outcomes, the impossibility to put to practice a proper 
enforcement mechanism for its guidelines, as well as the consensus-only 
rule dominating its decision-making processes. In other words, “this 
informal approach permitted neither the development of interconnection 
capacities nr the coordination of Member State’s energy policies”153. 
These considerations led to Regulation 713/2009, establishing the 
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (hereinafter: ACER). 
ACER shares many common elements with the Body of European 
Regulators in Electronic Communication (BEREC, also established in 
2009), since both answer to the need to strengthen regulatory 
convergence in disjointed market scenarios where harmonisation 
networks have failed in determining a truly integrated context. In fact, 
both BEREC
154
 and ACER have very effectively been defined “network 
agencies”, since “[...] the existing networks, such as ERGEG in energy, 
are incorporated into the agencies as Boards of Regulators which will, 
together with the Directors and Administrative Boards, cooperate with 
the Commission and the NRAs to further the completion of the internal 
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 Cit. LAVRIJSSEN – HANCHER, Networks on track: from European regulatory networks 
to European regulatory “network agencies”, in “Legal Issues of Economic Integration”, 
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 Cfr. EBERLEIN, Regulation by cooperation: the “Third Way” in making rules for the 
internal Energy market, in “Legal aspects of EU Energy regulation”, Oxford University 
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 Ibidem. 
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 Unfortunately, due to the brief nature of the present paper, it is impossible to focus 
on the nature and structure of this network. For a complete analysis, Cfr. CANEPA, Reti 
europee in cammino, cit., p. 72 ff. 
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market. These agencies are also intended to provide a greater political 
and legal independence for the members of the networks – the NRAs - 
from their national governments. In the opinion of the Commission, 
inadequate political independence at national level indeed hampers an 
effective and impartial application of European law, and this is one of the 
reasons why ACER was created as a network agency.”155 
Clearly, some relevant responsibility, accountability and 
structural issues arise from this innovative regulatory tool, especially in 
the area of energy legislation. The main juridical issues arising from 
network agency regulation will, in fact, be coped with in paragraph 4.3. 
Conversely, in paragraph 4.2 some paramount features of ACER will be 
attentively looked at, in order to properly assess its juridical, as well as 
institutional, status. 
 
4.2 Harmonisation networks and network agencies: 
structural elements 
 
 The objective of this paragraph is to present a critical overview of 
the main features regarding ACER, so that the policy-making criticism 
put forward in paragraph 4.3 is backed by stable normative observations. 
In particular, the internal governance mechanisms implemented in the 
Agency will be taken into consideration, from both a static and a 
dynamic perspective. As a matter of facts, a number of Regulations have 
been issued in order to assess structural matter relating to ACER, so that 
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the overall legislative framework ends up being complex and rather 
articulated.  
According to TEP, ACER aims at “assisting the regulatory authorities 
[...] in exercising, at Community level, the regulatory tasks performed in 
the Member States and, where necessary, to coordinate their action”. 
Therefore, “its objectives are thus to provide a framework for the 
cooperation of NRAs, complement their actions at EU level to address 
regulatory gaps on cross-border issues and provide greater regulatory 
certainty. Concretely, ACER will primarily have an advisory role in 
relation to national Transportation System Operators (thereafter TSOs), 
national regulators, the European Commission, the Council and the 
European Parliament, as well as a monitoring role on behalf of the 
Commission”156. 
In this respect, Table 3
157
 provides a scheme concerning the most 
relevant tasks assigned to ACER and the respective legal basis. The 
Agency is a juridical subject with versatile competences, ranging from 
TSOs coordination, to NRAs, to Security issues in cross-border markets. 
Moreover, both electricity and gas sectors are involved, so that ACER 
ends up being a comprehensive institution in a network governance 
environment. 
 
Table 3: schema of the main tasks assigned to ACER and respective legal 
basis 
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A - Tasks assigned by the Third Package 
 
Agency’s task 
 
Type of action 
 
Legal basis 
 
Tasks regarding ENTSOs
158 
 
1. Provide an opinion to the 
Commission on draft 
statutes, list of members 
and draft rules of procedure 
of ENTSOs. 
 
Opinion 
 
Article 6(1) Reg 713/2009; 
Article 5(2) Reg 714/2009, 
and Article 5(2) Reg 
715/2009 
 
2.    Monitor the execution of 
ENTSOs tasks. 
 
Monitoring 
 
Article 6(2) Reg 713/2009; 
Article 9 Reg 714/2009, and 
Article 9 Reg 715/2009 
 
3. Provide an opinion to 
ENTSOs on the draft annual 
work programme, the draft 
Community-wide network 
development plan and other 
relevant documents (e.g. 
annual summer and winter 
supply outlooks). 
 
Opinion 
 
Article 6(3)(b) Reg 713/2009; 
Article 9(2) Reg 714/2009; 
Article 9(2) Reg 715/2009 
 
4. Provide, based on matter 
of facts, a duly reasoned opinion 
as well as recommendations to 
ENTSOs, the Commission, the 
European Parliament and the 
Council where it considers that 
the draft annual work 
programme or the draft 
Community- wide network 
development plan do not comply 
with the objectives or the 
relevant provisions of the Third 
Package. 
 
 
Reasoned opinion 
 
Recommendation 
 
Article 6(4) Reg 713/2009; 
Article 9(2) Reg 714/2009; 
Article 9(2) Reg 715/2009 
 
5. Monitor the implementation 
of Community-wide 
NDPs
159
, investigate the 
reasons for inconsistencies 
between Community NDPs, 
and their implementation and 
make recommendations to 
TSOs, NRAs or other 
competent bodies. 
 
Monitoring 
 
Recommendation 
 
Article 6(8) Reg 713/2009 
                                                          
158
 ENTSOs – European Network of Transmission System Operators. 
159
 NDPs – Network Development Plans. 
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6.   Provide opinions to NRAs 
– at NRAs’ request - and 
recommendations to 
ENTSOs or NRAs to 
ensure consistency of 
national 10yr-network 
development plans with 
the Community-wide 10yr- 
network development plans. 
 
Monitoring 
Opinion 
Recommendation 
 
Article 8(11) Reg 714/2009; 
Article 8(11) Reg 715/2009; 
Article 22(5) Dir 2009/72; 
Article 22(5) Dir 2009/73 
 
7.    Provide an opinion to 
ENTSOs on network 
codes not relating to areas 
covered by a request 
addressed to the ENTSOs by 
the Commission. 
 
Opinion 
 
Article 6(3)(a) Reg 713/2009; 
Article 8(2) Reg 714/2009; 
Article 8(2) Reg 715/2009 
 
8. Participate in the 
development of network 
codes relating to areas 
covered by a request 
addressed to the ENTSOs by 
the Commission. 
 
Consultation 
 
Article 6(4) Reg 713/2009; 
Article 6 Reg 714/2009 
Article 6 Reg 715/2009 
 
9. Submit non-binding 
framework guidelines to the 
Commission, carry out 
consultation on draft 
framework guidelines; if 
necessary, review the 
framework guidelines and re-
submit them to the 
Commission. 
 
Drafting 
 
Consultation 
 
Article 6(4) Reg 713/2009; 
Article 6(2) to (4) Reg 
714/2009; 
Article 6 (2) to (4) Reg 
715/2009 
 
10.  Provide a reasoned 
opinion to ENTSOs on 
network codes developed on 
the basis of framework 
guidelines. 
 
Reasoned opinion 
 
Article 6(4) Reg 713/2009; 
Article 6(7) Reg 714/2009; 
Article 6(7) Reg 715/2009 
 
11.  Submit network codes 
developed by ENTSOs on 
the basis of framework 
guidelines to the 
Commission and recommend 
that they be adopted. 
 
Recommendation 
 
Article 6(4) Reg 713/2009; 
Article 6(9) Reg 714/2009; 
Article 6(9) Reg 715/2009 
 
12.  Prepare and submit draft 
network codes to the 
Commission, at the 
request of the Commission 
and where the ENTSO failed 
to develop a 
network code upon a 
Commission’s request. 
 
Drafting 
Recommendation 
 
Article 6(4) Reg 713/2009; 
Article 6(10) Reg 714/2009; 
Article 6(10) Reg 715/2009 
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13.  Propose amendments to 
network codes. 
 
Reasoned proposal 
 
 
Consultation 
 
Article 7(1) and (2) Reg 
714/2009; 
Article 7(1) and (2) Reg 
715/2009 
 
14.  Provide duly reasoned 
opinion to the Commission, 
where ENTSOs have failed 
to implement a non–binding 
network code. 
 
Reasoned opinion 
 
Article 6(5) Reg 713/2009; 
Article 8(2) Reg 714/2009; 
Article 8(2) Reg 715/2009 
 
15.  Monitor and analyse the 
implementation of binding 
network codes and 
Guidelines, and report to the 
Commission. 
 
Monitoring Reporting 
 
Article 6(6) Reg 713/2009 
 
16.  Monitor progress as 
regards the 
implementation of projects to 
create new interconnector 
capacity. 
 
Monitoring 
 
Article 6(7) Reg 713/2009 
 
17.  Monitor regional cooperation 
of TSOs; take due account of 
the outcome when 
formulating its opinions, 
recommendations and 
decisions. 
 
Monitoring 
 
Article 6(9) Reg 713/2009; 
Article 12 Reg 714/2009 
Article 12 Reg 715/2009 
 
Tasks regarding NRAs 
 
18.  Provide a framework for 
NRAs' cooperation. Promote 
cooperation between NRAs 
and TSOs at regional and 
EU level. Make 
recommendations on 
binding rules for 
cooperation to the 
Commission. 
 
Cooperation 
Recommendation 
 
Article 7(3) Reg 713/2009; 
Article 6(2) Dir 2009/72 
Article 7(2) Dir 2009/73 
 
19.  Adopt individual decisions 
on technical issues as 
provided for in the Third 
Package. 
 
Decision 
 
Article 7(1) Reg 713/2009 
 
20.  Provide recommendations on 
the harmonisation of 
technical rules. 
 
Recommendation 
 
Article 5 Dir 2009/72; 
Article 8 Dir 2009/73 
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21.  Provide recommendations to 
assist NRAs and market 
players in sharing good 
practices. 
 
Recommendation 
 
Article 7(2) Reg 713/2009 
 
22.  Provide an opinion on 
whether a NRA decision 
complies with Guidelines 
or other relevant provisions 
of the Third Package and 
inform the Commission and 
the MS 
concerned where the NRA 
does not comply with the 
opinion of the Agency. 
 
Opinion 
 
Article 7((4) and (5) Reg 
713/2009; 
Article 39 Dir 2009/72; 
Article 43 Dir 2009/73 
 
23.  Deliver an opinion when an 
NRA encounters, in a 
specific case, difficulties 
with the application of 
Guidelines. 
 
Opinion 
 
Article 7(6) Reg 713/2009 
 
24.  Provide an opinion on 
decisions of NRAs on TSO 
certification. At the request of 
the Commission, 
express its views on the 
certification of third 
countries TSOs. 
 
Opinion 
 
Article 9(2) Reg 713/2009; 
Article 3(1) Reg 714/2009; 
Article 3(1) Reg 715/2009; 
Article 11(6) Dir 2009/72; 
Article 11(6) Dir 2009/73 
 
Tasks regarding terms and conditions for access to and operational security of cross- border 
infrastructure 
 
25.  Decisions on cross-border 
infrastructure, including 
exemption decisions for new 
interconnectors and new gas 
infrastructures. 
 
Decision 
 
Article 7(7) and Articles 8 and 
9 Reg 713/2009; 
Article 17(5) Reg 714/2009; 
Article 36 (4) Dir 2009/73 
 
Monitoring and reporting on the electricity and natural gas sectors 
 
26.  Monitor the internal 
markets in electricity and 
natural gas. 
 
Monitoring 
 
Article 11(1) Reg 713/2009 
 
27.  Produce a public annual 
report on the results of 
monitoring and, at the 
same time, submit an 
opinion to the European 
Parliament and to the 
Commission on the 
measures that could be 
taken to remove barriers to 
the completion of the 
internal markets in 
electricity and natural gas. 
 
Publication of 
monitoring results 
 
 
Opinion 
 
Article 11(2) and (3) Reg 
713/2009 
 
Consultations and transparency 
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28.  Consult with market 
participants, TSOs, 
consumers, end-users, 
competition authorities. 
 
Consultation 
 
Article 10(1) and (3) Reg 
713/2009 
 
29.  Provide objective, reliable 
and easily accessible 
information to the public 
and interested parties. 
 
Information 
 
Article 10(2) Reg 713/2009 
 
30.  Make public agenda, 
background documents 
and minutes of meetings of 
AB, BoR and BoA. 
 
Publication 
 
Article 10(4) Reg 713/2009 
 
Other tasks 
 
31.  Approve compliance 
programmes of joint 
undertakings. 
 
Approval 
 
Article 6(4) Dir 2009/72; 
Article 7(4) Dir 2009/73 
 
32.  Respond to consultation on 
Guidelines. 
 
Opinion 
 
Article 18(3) Reg 714/2009; 
Article 23(1) Reg 715/2009 
 
33.  Provide opinions or 
recommendations on any of 
the issues relating to the 
purpose for which it has 
been established, upon a 
request of the European 
Parliament, the Council or 
the 
Commission, or on its own 
initiative. 
 
Opinion 
Recommendation 
 
Article 5 Reg 713/2009 
 
34.  Provide secretarial 
services to the 
Administrative Board. 
 
Support 
 
Article 12(3) Reg 713/2009 
 
35.  Provide secretarial 
services to the Board of 
Regulators. 
 
Support 
 
Article 14(5) Reg 713/2009 
 
  
70 
 
 
 
B - Tasks assigned by the ITC Regulation 
 
Agency’s task 
 
Type of action 
 
Legal basis 
 
ITC Mechanism 
 
1.  Oversee the implementation of 
the Inter-Transmission System 
Operator Compensation 
(‘ITC’) Mechanism. 
 
Monitoring 
 
Point 1.4 Guidelines on the 
ITC Mechanism – Annex to 
Reg 838/2010 – Part A 
 
2.  Report to the Commission on the 
implementation of the ITC 
mechanism and the management 
of the ITC fund. 
 
Reporting 
 
Point 1.4 Guidelines on the 
ITC Mechanism – Annex to 
Reg 838/2010 – Part A 
 
3.  Provide an opinion on multi- 
party agreements’ 
recommendations on adjustment 
to total compensation for the 
compensation for making 
infrastructure available to host 
cross-border flows of electricity. 
 
Opinion 
 
Point 3.3 Guidelines on the 
ITC Mechanism – Annex to 
Reg 838/2010 – Part A 
 
4.  Provide a response to the 
Commission’s consultation on 
the opinion on multi-party 
agreements relating to the 
compensation for the costs of 
hosting cross-border flows of 
electricity between transmission 
system 
operators participating in the 
ITC mechanism and those 
transmission system 
operators from third countries. 
 
Response to 
consultation 
 
Point 3.6 Guidelines on the 
ITC Mechanism – Annex to 
Reg 838/2010 – Part A 
 
5.  Make a proposal to the 
Commission on the annual 
cross-border infrastructure 
compensation sum and provide 
an opinion to the Commission as 
to the suitability of using long 
run average incremental costs for 
the assessment of the costs of 
making infrastructure 
available for hosting cross- 
border flows. 
 
Proposal Opinion 
 
Points 5.1, 5.3, and 5.5 
Guidelines on the ITC 
Mechanism – Annex to Reg 
838/2010 – Part A 
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6.  Provide an opinion to the 
Commission in case of 
disagreement on the proposal on 
the annual cross-border 
infrastructure compensation sum. 
 
Opinion 
 
Point 5.1 Guidelines on the 
ITC Mechanism – Annex to 
Reg 838/2010 – Part A 
 
Transmission Charging 
 
7.  Monitor the appropriateness of 
the ranges of allowable 
transmission charges. 
 
Monitoring 
 
Point 4. Guidelines for A 
Common Regulatory 
Approach to Transmission 
Charging - Annex to Reg 
838/2010 – Part B 
 
8.  Provide an opinion to the 
Commission as to the appropriate 
range or ranges of transmission 
charges for the period after 1 
January 2015. 
 
Opinion 
 
Point 5. Guidelines for A 
Common Regulatory 
Approach to Transmission 
Charging - Annex to Reg 
838/2010 – Part B 
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C - Tasks assigned by the SoS Regulation 
 
Agency’s task 
 
Type of action 
 
Legal basis 
 
1. Participate in the Gas 
Coordination Group 
established to facilitate the 
coordination of measures 
concerning security of gas 
supply. 
 
Membership 
 
Article 12(1) Reg 994/2010 
 
 
 
 
D - Tasks assigned by REMIT 
 
Agency’s task 
 
Type of action 
 
Legal basis 
 
Monitoring, data collection, and registration 
 
1. Monitor, in close collaboration 
with NRAs and other relevant 
authorities, 
trading activity in wholesale 
energy products to detect and 
prevent trading based on 
inside information and 
market manipulation. 
 
Monitoring 
 
Article 7(1) Reg 1227/2011 
 
2. Collect the data for assessing 
and monitoring wholesale 
energy markets. 
 
Data collection 
 
Articles 3(4)(b), 4(2), 7(1), 8, 
10(3), 16(2) and (3) 
Reg 1227/2011 
 
3. Establish a European 
Register of market 
participants. 
 
Data collection 
 
Article 9(3) Reg 1227/2011 
 
Reporting and recommendations 
 
4. Report to the Commission on 
its activities under the 
Regulation. 
 
Reporting 
 
Article 7(3) Reg 1227/2011 
 
5. Make recommendations to the 
Commission as regards market 
rules, standards, and procedures 
which could improve market 
integrity and the functioning of 
the 
internal market. 
 
Recommendation 
 
Article 7(3) Reg 1227/2011 
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6. Make recommendations to the 
Commission as to the records 
of transactions, including 
orders to trade, which it 
considers are necessary to 
effectively and efficiently 
monitor wholesale energy 
markets. 
 
Recommendation 
 
Article 7(3) Reg 1227/2011 
 
Cooperation at Union and national level 
 
7. Cooperate with NRAs, 
ESMA
160
, national 
financial market authorities 
and national competition 
authorities. 
 
Cooperation 
 
Article 1(3) Reg 1227/2011 
 
8. Ensure that NRAs carry out 
their tasks under the 
Regulation in a coordinated 
and consistent manner. 
 
Coordination 
 
Article 16 Reg 1227/2011 
 
9. Publish non-binding guidance 
on the application of the 
definitions set out in 
Article 2 of the Regulation. 
 
Guidance 
 
Article 16(1) Reg 1227/2011 
 
10.  Establish a mechanism to share 
information on trading 
activities in wholesale energy 
products with NRAs, 
competent financial authorities 
of the Member States, national 
competition 
authorities, ESMA and other 
relevant authorities. 
 
Guidance 
 
Cooperation 
 
Article 10(1) Reg 1227/2011 
 
11.  Cooperate with the authorities 
responsible for overseeing 
trading in emissions allowances 
or derivatives relating to 
emissions allowances and 
establish mechanisms to share 
information on records of 
transactions in such allowances 
and derivatives. 
 
Cooperation 
 
Article 10(3) Reg 1227/2011 
 
12.  Inform ESMA and the 
competent financial 
authority, on its own initiative 
or at NRAs’ request, where it 
suspects that acts are being or 
have been carried out which 
constitute market abuse. 
 
Information 
 
Article 16(2) and (3)(b) and 
(d) Reg 1227/2011 
                                                          
160
 ESMA – European Securities and Markets Authority 
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13.  Request, on its own initiative or 
at NRAs’ request, one or more 
national regulatory authorities 
to supply any information 
related to a suspected breach of 
the Regulation. 
 
Information 
 
Article 16(2) and (4)(a) Reg 
1227/2011 
 
14.  Request, on its own initiative or 
at NRAs’ request, one or more 
national regulatory authorities 
to commence an investigation 
and to take appropriate action 
where it suspects that there has 
been a breach of the 
Regulation. 
 
Guidance 
 
Article 16(2) and (4)(b) Reg 
1227/2011 
 
15.  Establish and coordinate, on its 
own initiative or at NRAs’ 
request, an investigatory 
group where it suspects that 
there has been a breach of the 
Regulation and it considers 
that the possible breach has, 
or has had, a cross-border 
impact. 
 
Coordination 
 
Article 16(2) and (4)(c) Reg 
1227/2011 
 
International relations 
 
16.  Develop contacts and enter into 
administrative arrangements 
with third country authorities 
in so far as is necessary to 
achieve the objectives set out 
in the Regulation, in particular, 
to promote the harmonisation 
of the regulatory framework. 
 
Cooperation 
 
Article 19 Reg 1227/2011 
 
Consultations and transparency 
 
17.  Publish the Report to the 
Commission on its activities 
under the Regulation. 
 
Publication 
 
Article 7(3) Reg 1227/2011 
 
18.  Consult with interested 
parties before making 
recommendations to the 
Commission as to the 
records of transactions. 
 
Consultation 
 
Article 7(3) Reg 1227/2011 
 
19.  Consult with the interested 
authorities before establishing 
the mechanisms to share 
information on trading activity 
in wholesale energy products 
with them. 
 
Consultation 
 
Article 10(1) Reg 1227/2011 
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20.  Make all recommendations 
available to the European 
Parliament, the Council and 
the Commission and to the 
public. 
 
Disclosure 
 
Article 7(3) Reg 1227/2011 
 
21.  Make the European register, or 
extracts thereof, as well 
as part of the information 
which it possesses publicly 
available provided that 
commercially sensitive 
information on individual 
market participants is not 
disclosed and subject to 
confidentiality requirements. 
 
Disclosure 
 
Articles 9(3) and 12 (2) Reg 
1227/2011 
 
22.  Adopt and publish 
transparent rules on the 
manner it will disseminate 
information. 
 
Adoption 
Publication 
 
Article 12(2) Reg 1227/2011 
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E - Tasks assigned by the TEN-E Regulation 
 
Agency’s task 
 
Type of action 
 
Legal basis 
 
Monitoring and recommendation 
 
1. Monitor the progress achieved 
in implementing the projects of 
common interest and make 
recommendations to facilitate 
the implementation of projects 
of common interest. 
 
Monitoring 
Recommendation 
 
Article 5(3) Reg 347/2013 
 
2. Submit to the Groups a 
consolidated report for the 
projects of common interest, 
evaluating the progress 
achieved and make, where 
appropriate, recommendations 
on how to overcome the delays 
and difficulties encountered. 
 
Reporting 
Recommendations 
 
Article 5 (5) Reg 347/2013, 
Article 6 (8) and (9) Reg 
713/2009 
 
3. Provide an opinion to Member 
States and the Commission on 
the methodologies submitted 
by ENTSOs and publish it. 
 
Opinion Publication 
 
Article 11(2) Reg 1347/2013 
 
4. Request of relevant network, 
load flow and market data and 
relevant confidentiality 
agreements. 
 
Request 
 
Article 11(5) Reg 1347/2013 
5. Request, on its own initiative or 
upon a duly reasoned request 
by NRAs or stakeholders, and 
after formally consulting the 
organisations representing 
all relevant stakeholders and the 
Commission, of updates and 
improvements of 
methodologies; publication 
of the requests by NRAs or 
stakeholders and of all 
relevant non-commercially 
sensitive documents. 
 
Request, 
Consultation 
Publication 
 
Article 11(6) Reg 1347/2013 
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6. Decision on investments 
requests, including cross- 
border cost allocation in case 
of disagreement among NRAs 
concerned or on their joint 
request; consultation of NRAs 
concerned and of project 
promoters; publication. 
 
Decision 
Consultation 
Publication 
 
Article 12 (6) Reg 1347/2013 
 
7. Notification to the 
Commission of all cost 
allocation decisions, 
together with all the relevant 
information. 
 
Notification 
 
Article 12 (7) Reg 1347/2013 
 
8. Facilitate the sharing of good 
practices and make 
recommendations regarding: (a) 
the appropriate 
incentives to be granted to 
some project of common 
interest; (b) a common 
methodology to evaluate the 
incurred higher risks of 
investments in electricity 
and gas infrastructure. 
 
Cooperation 
Recommendation 
 
Article 13 (5) Reg 1347/2013 
and Article 7(2) Reg 
713/2009 
 
9. Opinion on the common 
network operation tools 
adopted by the ENTSOs. 
 
Opinion 
 
Article 8 (3) Reg 714/2009 
 
10.  Ensure exchange of 
information between 
Groups. 
 
Information 
 
Annex III (1) 
 
11.  Where necessary, check the 
consistent application of the 
criteria/cost-benefit analysis 
methodology and evaluate their 
cross-border relevance for 
proposed projects falling under 
the categories set out in Annex 
II.1 and 2 of Regulation 
1347/2013. 
 
Analysis 
 
Annex III (2) 
 
12.  Opinion on the draft regional 
list of proposed projects falling 
under the categories set out in 
Annex II.1 and 2 drawn up by 
the Groups. 
 
Opinion 
 
Annex III (2) and Article 15(1) 
Reg 713/2009 
78 
 
In this framework, particular relevance is given to internal 
governance issues. Indeed, the Agency is prima facie structured in the 
way which is common to the majority of EU regulators. Following the 
traditional schema, the Board of Directors interacts with the Director and 
the Board of Regulators (which represents the former ERGEG) in order 
to implement regulation objectives. The Board of Directors is composed 
of nine members
161
 and the designation
162
 of the Director is among its 
main functions. On the other hand, the Board of Regulators (again: 
consistently with ERGEG) is composed of one NRA representative per 
Member State, plus one EU Commission representative without any right 
to vote; it is independent from national governments and it adopts the 
yearly Working Program. 
The considerations proposed are very linear and down-to-earth; 
however, they are interesting as they point out that ACER, far from being 
a new and utterly revolutionary institutional body within the EU, is 
nothing but an evolution and strengthening of ERGEG, as the role given 
to the Board of Regulators in the 2009 Agency is ample and well-
structured. In this sense, it seems possible to affirm that ACER represents 
a regulatory evolution, instead of a governance revolution. Indeed, 
having seen the role assigned to the Board of Regulators, it seems 
acceptable to classify the Agency as an institutional integration of 
ERGEG, the independence of which is clearly stated in several 
provisions, including the aforementioned Article 14(5). 
                                                          
161
 In total, 2 members are nominated by the EU Commission, 2 by the European 
Parliament and 5 by the EU Council. 
162
 The designation has to happen in accordance with the Board of Regulators. 
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Grippingly enough, the reality of ACER is completely different, 
since the actual dynamics of its internal governance bodies underline 
several structural discrepancies between the Agency and the ERGEG 
harmonisation network. In particular, according to the TEP, the approval 
of the BoR is necessary in order to proceed in the decision-making 
process; moreover, the required majority is two thirds. However, a 
fundamental hierarchical element has been introduced in the Agency’s 
practice from its very beginning (2009 – 2014): the Board only rejects or 
approves the motion proposed by the Director, without any integration, 
modification, substitution or addition in terms of amendments
163
.  
The momentum of such an interpretation of the relevant Rules of 
Procedure is evident: the strong role of the Director, who acts in 
accordance with the main normative guidelines coming from the 
Commission, introduces an apical element in the regulatory dynamics of 
the Agency, clearly limiting its “network factor”. Thus, it is possible to 
reverse the provisional opinion stated above: ACER in fact does 
represent a proper revolution in terms of policy-making tools within the 
energy sector in the EU, as it reduces the network capacity it was 
originally built upon in order to promote a strong convergence in terms 
of both regulatory practice and normative outcomes. 
 
 
                                                          
163
 Interestingly, the Board has never rejected any proposal coming from the Director 
in the time frame 2010 – 2014 (cfr. www.acer.com ). 
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4.3 Main criticism(s): ex ante or ex post policy making? 
  
Chapter 4 has dealt with the definition of the regulatory tools chosen 
by the EU legislator (from the mid 1990s to 2009) in order to achieve 
market liberalisation in the energy sector. In particular, an evolutionary 
approach has been privileged so that the main normative discourse 
leading to the construction of ACER with the Third Energy Package has 
been developed, while keeping an eye on the main problematic and 
pragmatic policy matters.  
Two fundamental conclusions can be drawn from the reflections 
briefly exposed above. First, with respect to ERGEG, ACER can be 
considered as a relevant tool in the definition of a stronger regulatory 
convergence in the energy sector. Second, the main dialogic relationships 
between its internal governance bodies tend to define a profound 
discrepancy between the Agency and its network counterpart, since some 
relevant hierarchical elements have been introduced in the constant 
practice of ACER. What is more, the peculiarity of this last systemic 
consideration is even more striking as it marks a fundamental difference 
between ACER and BEREC, active in the communication sector, where 
the role of national regulators is strengthened through a series of specific 
previsions ensuring its proper “network agency” structure. 
Having clarified these intriguing aspects, it is now paramount to 
underline some systemic issues concerning the main regulatory 
techniques used within the EU energy sector. In particular, since the role 
of sector regulation shifts from informal harmonisation networks to 
formal agency discipline, fostering regulatory convergence implies a 
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move towards accountability. Notably, this accountability is both legal 
and political, and it “involves a multi-level situation with different lines 
of responsibility” 164  running between the Commission, the regulatory 
network agency, the Member States and their NRAs. Much of the legal 
and political science literature has focussed on the accountability deficits 
of the networks themselves
165
, but “in the light of the repositioning of the 
regulatory networks as European network agencies, it remains equally 
important to consider their position vis a vis the Commission in the 
future, and the division of competences between these new agencies and 
the Commission itself”166. 
As the nature of the links between the Commission and NRAs 
through ACER is an evolving process, addressing the main juridical 
issues arising from these interactions surely represents an important 
challenge within the accountability scenario, as well as the one depicted 
by market harmonisation monitoring
167
. More importantly, however, it 
should not be underestimated that assuming that the centralisation strive 
represented by the shift from ERGEG to ACER represents ipso facto a 
more integrated market and a more efficient policy-making context, 
would be wrong. Indeed, in this field European ex ante regulation 
remains weak, mainly due to the structural shortcomings presented at the 
beginning of this Chapter (lack of primary legal basis, mainly national 
economic competence over energy issues). Most of all, the lack of a 
                                                          
164
 Cit. HANCHER, Manufacturing, cit., p. 3. 
165
 Cfr. HOFMAN – TURK, The development of integrated administration in the EU and 
its consequences, European Law Journal, n. 2/2007, pp. 253 – 271; CURTIN, Holding 
quasi – autonomous EU administrative actors to public account, European Law Journal, 
n. 4/2007, pp. 523 – 541; PAPADOPULOS, Problems of democratic accountability in 
network and multilevel governance, European Law Journal, n. 4/2007, pp. 469 – 488. 
166
 Cit. HANCHER, Manufacturing, cit., p. 12. 
167
 Ibidem. 
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proper basis for the Commission to act on energy-specific sectors (with 
particular regards to cross-border issues) has led to its necessity to rely 
on NRAs both in order to create consensus among stakeholders on 
particular normative initiatives and in order to gain some relevant 
expertise on the highly technical energy issues
168
. Conversely, the 
Commission does have both legal enforcement mechanisms and adequate 
expertise in the ex post regulation connected with antitrust policy-
making
169
.  
In Chapter 5 the main conclusions following this discourse will be 
addressed, with regards to the controversial relationship between 
competition law and sector-specific regulation. Also, some systemic 
considerations concerning the role of policy making within the energy 
sector will be put forward: is the present model efficient and/or 
sustainable? How does energy policy making interact with the normative 
core of the EU? Finally, some general conclusions will be traced, along 
with some hints for future research. 
  
                                                          
168
 In this respect, it is worth noting that ACER’s Board of Regulators is composed by 
highly specialised professionals, which have both a practical and a technological skills 
equipment lacking in the context of the Commission. 
169
 The relationship between sector-specific regulation and antitrust policy-making will 
be discussed in Paragraph 5.1. 
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5 From competition to integration 
 
reviously, the administrative concept of networks has been 
observed, with particular reference to macroeconomic network 
governance. Then, the main economic background to the 
internal energy market has been taken into consideration, in order to set a 
suitable scenario for the analysis of the shift from the reticular model 
represented by ERGEG to the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators. 
Some problematic issues concerning ACER have already been put 
forward at the end of Chapter 4; now, it seems appropriate to trace some 
fundamental conclusions, with particular regards to both the relationship 
between sector-specific regulation and antitrust policy making (paragraph 
5.1) and the overall sustainability in terms of efficient policy-making of 
the entire context proposed above (paragraph 5.2). Finally, some 
conclusive remarks will underline the most relevant findings of the 
present thesis. 
5.1 Competition law and sector regulation 
 
 The decision to use competition law in an intrusive way in order 
to shape a peculiar form of ex post policy making within the energy 
sector has been made clear by the Commission in its 2007 Sector 
Inquiry
170
. Actually, the extensive use of competition law in energy 
matters is no news to the European context, where a well-known case law 
                                                          
170
 DG Competition, Report on Energy Sector Inquiry, SEC(2006) 1724 final of 
10.1.2007. 
P 
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from the European Court of Justice (ECJ) clearly applies antitrust 
policies to EU energy sectors since the mid 1960s
171
. Indeed, competition 
rules are based upon primary EC legislation, and their application cannot 
be impaired by the pertinence of a particular topic to the energy sector. 
What is more, the 2003 Deutsche Telekom case
172
 confirmed that 
antitrust law is enforceable when abuses of dominance can still happen 
notwithstanding a decision from national authorities
173
. In particular, The 
Deutsche Telekom case concerned the prices charged by Deutsche 
Telekom to competitors for accessing the local loop. As these prices 
exceeded those charged to Deutsche Telekom subscribers on the retail 
market, the Commission considered that the Deutsche Telekom pricing 
strategy could be analysed as a margin squeeze. The German incumbent 
argued that its prices to competitors could not be in breach of Art 82 
EC
174
 due to the previous acceptance by the German regulator. The 
Commission however dismissed this argument and considered that the 
responsibility of Deutsche Telekom was engaged in view of the 
superiority of Art 82 EC over secondary EC law in the hierarchy of 
community rules
175
. 
 Clearly, a far-reaching usage of competition law in the utilities 
and energy sectors, albeit fully legitimate
176
, represents a divergent and 
                                                          
171
 The obvious reference is to the Costa v. Enel case, Case 6/64 [1964] ECR 585. 
172
 Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579, Deutsche Telekom AG, OJ 14.10.2003, L 
263/9.  Also, see Court of First Instance: Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom AG v. 
Commission of the European Communities, [2008] ECR II-00477. 
173
For a complete analysis of the issues raised by the Deutsche Telekom case, see 
MONTI, Managing the intersection of utilities regulation and EC competition law, in 
“the competition law review”, 4(2)/2008, pp. 123 – 145. 
174
 Now art. 102 TFUE, concerning abuses of market dominance. 
175
 Cfr. HANCHER, Manufacturing, cit., p. 8, footnote 23. 
176
 Cfr. CAMERON, The internal merket in energy: harnessing the new regulatory 
regime, in European Law Review, n. 30(05)/2005, pp. 631 – 648. 
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supererogatory way to shape the relevant markets, thus creating ex post 
unpredictable policy-making tools jeopardising legal certainty and 
normative predictability. Indeed, using antitrust legislation as “a tool to 
build markets” 177  raises substantial problems in within the EU 
institutional context, especially if this feature is complemented with the 
tendency to impose sanctions. Moreover, it is possible to affirm
178
 that 
the usage of antitrust regulation is “going beyond the ex post control of 
market conduct” 179 , through the coupling of pure antitrust laws and 
“quasi-regulatory instruments”180, in order to foster the liberalisation of 
the energy market. The latter include forced ownership unbundling, 
entity split-ups, forced auctions or divestitures implying long-term 
monitoring by antitrust authorities. 
 The main problems arising from this peculiar policy-making 
environment mainly focus, as already mentioned above, on two 
fundamental concerns. First, it is possible to doubt of the ability of the 
Commission to deliver efficient decisions within its set of legal and 
judicial constraints
181
. Then, more importantly, the lack of predictability 
and certainty of law emerging from this context should not be underrated. 
In other words, “the already uncertain gains in terms of efficiency should 
                                                          
177
 ibidem 
178
 Cfr. cases Case T-87/05 EDP - Energias de Portugal, SA v. Commission, [2005] ECR II-
03745.; Case M.1853 EDF/EnBW, IP/01/175 of 7.2.2001 ; 27 Case M.4180 GDF/Suez, 
O.J. 29.3.2007, L 88/47; 28 Case COMP 39.388 E.ON, O.J. 13.2.2009, C36/8 ; 29 Case 
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 Cfr. HANCHER, Manufacturing, cit., p. 9. 
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 Ibidem. 
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 Ibid, p. 13. 
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not be offset by the welfare loss arising from the consequences of legal 
uncertainty”182. 
5.2 Equity and efficacy in public policy-making: the 
energy sector 
 
 Finally, some systemic observations concerning the vexata 
quaestio of policy-making delegation to third parties must be put to 
paper. Unfortunately, due to the brevity of the present paper, only the 
most relevant traits of the dispute will be considered, and particular 
reference will be made to the contrast between legal constraints and 
vested interests in the ACER policy-making setting
183
. Indeed, the 
original structure of ACER (that is: not considering the evolution of its 
internal governance dynamics, introducing tangible verticistic and 
hierarchical elements thus making it strongly different from the ERGEG 
model) answers to the need for the establishment of a “European network 
plus” expressed by Member States. Therefore, it is safe to admit that 
ACER represents a step towards accountability-sharing among NRAs, 
while safeguarding the flexibility, independence and centrality of the 
Board of Regulators. 
 Previously, the phrase “legal constraints” has been used. In this 
respect, we mainly refer to the so-called “Meroni184 doctrine”, according 
to which policy-making delegation from the Commission to third parties 
is forbidden. In particular, according to the ECJ, “the powers delegated 
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 Cfr. HAUTECLOCQUE, Legal uncertainty and competition policy in European 
deregulated electricity markets: the case of long-term exclusive supply contracts, in 
“World Competition”, 2009, pp. 91 – 112. 
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 Cfr. HANCHER, Manufacturing, cit., p. 7. 
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can be neither greater nor different than those granted in the first place by 
primary or secondary EC law. Delegation thus cannot lead to the creation 
of new powers since this would upset the so-called institutional balance. 
Only strictly defined executive powers can be delegated, but not political 
or decision making powers. This implies that the delegating entity must 
conserve the ultimate decision power and strictly monitor 
implementation by the agency. The problem then becomes to 
differentiate between technical and truly political powers. [...] The 
doctrine last postulates that a decision of such an agency can only be 
case-specific and will not have a more general value on which firms 
could rely in other contexts.”185 
 The main structure of the Agency, as it has been recalled in the 
previous chapter, surely abides to the criteria provided for in the Meroni 
doctrine, at least from a formalistic perspective. As a matter of fact, its 
powers are limited and, overall, they do not imply any policy delegation 
from the Commission. However, the governance and policy-making 
implications of the foundation of ACER should not be underestimated, 
with particular reference to the developments of the dialogue between the 
internal governance bodies mentioned above. In other words, is it safe to 
say that, substantially, no policy-making tools are delegated to ACER, 
when its regular practice (since 2009) has implied a strong role for the 
Director and an increasingly marginal position for the Board of 
Regulators (and, thus, NRAs)? 
                                                          
185
 Cit. HANCHER, Manufacturing, cit., p. 7. For a complete overview of both the 
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 The scepticism with respect to the compliance to the Meroni 
doctrine could be overcome thanks to some very recent developments in 
the ECJ case law. As a matter of fact, in its 2014 decision on ESMA
186
, 
the European Court of Justice may have set the basis for a global 
rethinking of the role of policy-making delegation within the European 
context. The case concerns the power of the European Securities and 
Markets Authority to adopt emergency measures on the financial markets 
of the Member States in order to regulate or prohibit short selling; in 
particular, according to the Court, the UK claimed that “ESMA has been 
given a very large measure of discretion of a political nature which is at 
odds with EU principles relating to the delegation of powers. The United 
Kingdom also submits that Article 114 TFEU
187
 is not the correct legal 
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 Case C-270/12 - United Kingdom v Parliament and Council, 22
nd
 January 2014. 
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 “1. Save where otherwise provided in the Treaties, the following provisions shall 
apply for the achievement of the objectives set out in Article 26. The European 
Parliament and the Council shall, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, adopt the 
measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action in Member States which have as their object the establishment 
and functioning of the internal market. 2.Paragraph 1 shall not apply to fiscal 
provisions, to those relating to the free movement of persons nor to those relating to 
the rights and interests of employed persons. 3.The Commission, in its proposals 
envisaged in paragraph 1 concerning health, safety, environmental protection and 
consumer protection, will take as a base a high level of protection, taking account in 
particular of any new development based on scientific facts. Within their respective 
powers, the European Parliament and the Council will also seek to achieve this 
objective. 4.If, after the adoption of a harmonisation measure by the European 
Parliament and the Council, by the Council or by the Commission, a Member State 
deems it necessary to maintain national provisions on grounds of major needs referred 
to in Article 36, or relating to the protection of the environment or the working 
environment, it shall notify the Commission of these provisions as well as the grounds 
for maintaining them. 5.Moreover, without prejudice to paragraph 4, if, after the 
adoption of a harmonisation measure by the European Parliament and the Council, by 
the Council or by the Commission, a Member State deems it necessary to introduce 
national provisions based on new scientific evidence relating to the protection of the 
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basis for the adoption of the rules laid down in Article 28 of the 
regulation.” Even though the Judgement regards ESMA, its potential 
influences on the global policy delegation scheme within the EU could be 
groundbreaking, since the Court subverted the UK’s position, thus paving 
the way for a revision of the Meroni doctrine while stretching the 
application of Article 114 TFEU towards a more ample and structured 
delegation policy-making power for the Commission. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                              
environment or the working environment on grounds of a problem specific to that 
Member State arising after the adoption of the harmonisation measure, it shall notify 
the Commission of the envisaged provisions as well as the grounds for introducing 
them. 6.The Commission shall, within six months of the notifications as referred to in 
paragraphs 4 and 5, approve or reject the national provisions involved after having 
verified whether or not they are a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised 
restriction on trade between Member States and whether or not they shall constitute 
an obstacle to the functioning of the internal market. In the absence of a decision by 
the Commission within this period the national provisions referred to in paragraphs 4 
and 5 shall be deemed to have been approved. When justified by the complexity of the 
matter and in the absence of danger for human health, the Commission may notify the 
Member State concerned that the period referred to in this paragraph may be 
extended for a further period of up to six months. 7.When, pursuant to paragraph 6, a 
Member State is authorised to maintain or introduce national provisions derogating 
from a harmonisation measure, the Commission shall immediately examine whether 
to propose an adaptation to that measure. 8.When a Member State raises a specific 
problem on public health in a field which has been the subject of prior harmonisation 
measures, it shall bring it to the attention of the Commission which shall immediately 
examine whether to propose appropriate measures to the Council. 9.By way of 
derogation from the procedure laid down in Articles 258 and 259, the Commission and 
any Member State may bring the matter directly before the Court of Justice of the 
European Union if it considers that another Member State is making improper use of 
the powers provided for in this Article. 10.The harmonisation measures referred to 
above shall, in appropriate cases, include a safeguard clause authorising the Member 
States to take, for one or more of the non-economic reasons referred to in Article 36, 
provisional measures subject to a Union control procedure.” 
90 
 
5.3 Conclusive remarks 
 
 At the end of the present thesis, some very essential conclusive 
remarks need to be expressed, with regards to the role and evolution of 
policy-making tools within the European context, in the shaping of the 
internal energy market. First, some preliminary observations concerning 
the definition and scope of macroeconomic governance through 
administrative networks of regulators have been identified. In particular, 
the subversion of the traditional and pyramidal idea of sovereignty has 
been observed, while keeping an eye on the main juridical and socio-
political literature on the topic. Thus, networks have been classified as 
paramount regulatory tools in the horizontal and multilevel scenario 
depicted by supranational governance, especially in the EU. 
 Then, some relevant economic background to the development of 
the internal energy market has been put to paper, so that the relationships 
between demand, supply, price volatility and taxation burden on end-
users has been made clearer. The overall picture is that of a fragmented 
context in which price regulation still prevails over liberalisation and 
concrete integration initiatives need to be undertaken in order to fulfil the 
objectives defined by EU directives. 
 Finally, the core of the thesis has been structured around the 
comparison and juxtaposition of ERGEG and ACER, so that energy 
regulation has represented a case study in order to assess the 
appropriateness of the general administrative and economic premises 
previously outlined. The most relevant findings can be summarised as 
follows. First, ACER was created in order to foster regulatory 
convergence in the field of the energy and gas sectors and, in this sense, 
91 
 
it represents a paramount step towards accountability, while maintaining 
a flexible structure due to the strong role of NRAs within its internal 
organisation. However, its Board of Regulators, composed of NRAs 
according to a traditional governance network scheme, does not have a 
clear-cut preeminent role in the internal governance logics of the Agency, 
since hierarchical elements have been put to practice, shaping a much 
more top-down approach while valorising the role of the Agency’s 
Director.  
In this sense, the ex ante policy making scheme in the energy 
sector defined through ACER lacks legal certainty (and legitimacy?) with 
both regards to ex post antitrust policy-making and compliance with the 
Meroni doctrine, regarding the prohibition of policy-making delegation. 
Some steps for further research may therefore interest the development of 
the ECJ’s case law in order to foster a more ample and shared policy-
making environment. 
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